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Volume I: ITA Report 
1.0 AUTHORIZATION AND NOTIFICATION   
David Hamilton, NESC Chief Engineer at Johnson Space Center (JSC), presented the risk 
assessment of the Orbiter liquid hydrogen (LH2) feedline flowliner cracking problem to the 
NESC Review Board on January 29, 2004.  The authorization to develop an Independent 
Technical Assessment (ITA) plan was approved by the NESC Review Board (NRB). 
 
The ITA plan was developed by Dr. Charles E. Harris and approved by the NRB on February 19, 
2004. 
 
In-briefings of the ITA plan were provided to Helen McConnaughey and John Muratore, 
Systems Engineering and Integration, on February 26, 2004, at Marshall Space Flight Center and 
Steve Poulos, Orbiter Project Office, was briefed on March 4, 2004, at Johnson Space Center. 
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4.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In May of 2002, three cracks were found in the downstream flowliner at the gimbal joint in the 
LH2 feedline at the interface with the Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump (LPFP) of Space Shuttle 
Main Engine (SSME) #1 of Orbiter OV-104. Subsequent inspections of the feedline flowliners in 
the other orbiters revealed the existence of 8 additional cracks.  No cracks were found in the LO2 
feedline flowliners.  A solution to the cracking problem was developed and implemented on all 
orbiters.  The solution included weld repair of all detectable cracks and the polishing of all slot 
edges to remove manufacturing discrepancies that could initiate new cracks.  Using the results of 
a fracture mechanics analysis with a scatter factor of 4 on the predicted fatigue life, the orbiters 
were cleared for return to flight with a one-flight rationale requiring inspections after each flight.  
OV-104 flew mission STS-112 and OV-105 flew mission STS-113. The post-flight inspections 
did not find any cracks in the repaired flowliners. 
 
Even though the flowliner repair solution appeared to be successful, the NASA and contractor 
engineering team continued to investigate the problem.  This continuing investigation was 
motivated by the fact that the actual cause of the original cracks had not been conclusively 
established.  As part of the continuing investigation, two engine hot fire test series were 
conducted at Stennis Space Center to characterize the LH2 feedline flow physics and to measure 
the flowliner vibratory response.  The test results were somewhat alarming because the vibratory 
strains recorded by strain gages mounted directly to the upstream and downstream flowliners 
were considerably higher than anticipated.  The strain gage data were used conservatively to 
develop a loading spectrum to represent the “worst-case” nominal flight.  An updated damage 
tolerance analysis of the flowliner was then conducted by the Boeing Company based on the 
inspection crack detection limit of 0.075 inches adopted in 2002.  The predicted values of 
residual fatigue life were only 0.8 missions for a circumferential crack in the upstream flowliner 
and 1.4 flights for the downstream flowliner.  These new results cast doubt on the validity of the 
flight rationale developed in 2002.  Subsequently, the Orbiter Program Office sponsored an 
extensive effort to resolve this problem.     
At the request of the Orbiter Program, the NESC conducted an assessment of the Orbiter LH2 
Feedline Flowliner cracking problem with a team of subject matter experts from throughout 
NASA. The first objective of the assessment was to characterize the flowliner cracking problem, 
identify constraints, establish the problem resolution space, and develop a problem resolution 
strategy.  After this objective was achieved, the NESC independently conducted a number of 
computational analyses and laboratory tests.   The NESC developed fatigue loading spectra for 
nominal flight conditions, refined fracture mechanics analysis methods, and a high fidelity 
inspection method for in-situ examination of the flowliner slots. The NESC also assessed 
available materials data to characterize the fatigue life and crack propagation behavior of Inconel 
718 in liquid hydrogen.  Using these data and methods, the NESC conducted fatigue life and 
damage tolerance analyses to estimate the residual fatigue lives of the upstream and downstream 
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flowliners for nominal flight conditions.  The results of these analyses were used to establish a 
strategy for developing a flight rationale for the certification conditions specified by the 
Program.  
Five General Findings have been concluded from the independent tests and analyses conducted 
by the NESC.  It is essential to note that these Findings are only applicable to the nominal flight 
condition.   The development of the flight rationale must be based on a complete assessment of 
the program-sanctioned loading spectra for all nominal and off-nominal flight conditions for 
which the orbiter must be certified before returning to flight.  The General Findings are:   
 
1. Based on the past flight history and the root causes investigation, the actions taken in 
2002 to repair the LH2 gimbal joint flowliners render the Orbiter safe to fly.  This is 
provided the flowliners are inspected before the next flight to ensure that all surface flaws 
were removed by polishing and all fatigue cracks were repaired.  In addition, an 
assessment of the certification loading spectra for the nominal and off-nominal flight 
conditions will be necessary to determine the post-flight inspection requirements.   
 
2. Based on a probabilistic risk assessment, the risk of SSME damage due to cracks in the 
flowliner is an insignificant contributor to the overall SSME catastrophic risk, assuming 
inspection after every flight. 
 
3. The similitude between the BTA/GTA ground tests environment and the Orbiter flight 
environment could not be established.  Therefore, there are uncertainties in the fatigue 
loading spectra developed from the BTA/GTA test data.  Unverified scale factors have 
been applied to the loads in the fatigue loading spectra in an attempt to account for these 
uncertainties.  Because of these uncertainties, there will be risks associated with any 
loading spectrum used to develop the flight rationale derived from the BTA/GTA 
experiment.  These concerns notwithstanding, we have concluded that the ground test 
data can be a suitable database to establish the certification spectra provided conservative 
scale factors based on appropriate engineering judgment are used to account for the 
uncertainties. 
 
4. Based on the NESC loading spectra for nominal flight conditions generated from the 
BTA/GTA test data, the conservative NESC ITA damage tolerance analysis for the 
circumferential crack locations requires inspection after every flight to detect a critical 
crack size of 0.020 inches and repair of any cracks found during the inspection.   Since 
these results were not generated for the official certification spectra, post-flight inspection 
requirements must be determined from an assessment of the certification loading spectra 
for the nominal and off-nominal flight conditions. 
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5. Based on the NESC loading spectra for nominal flight conditions generated from the 
BTA/GTA test data, the conservative NESC ITA fatigue life analysis shows a positive 
margin of safety for one flight, but is not sufficient to cover the remaining anticipated 
operational life of each orbiter. 
 
Based on the five General Findings stated above, the NESC ITA has concluded that the 
Orbiters are safe to return to flight provided the specific recommendations listed below are 
implemented: 
 
1. Establish the surface quality of the slots by using a high fidelity inspection method such as 
edge replication.  Assess the effectiveness of the original polishing done in 2002 to determine 
if all manufacturing defects have been removed.  Re-polish the slots as required to remove all 
significant surface defects.  Also, repair any fatigue cracks found during this inspection. 
 
2. Perform a damage tolerance analysis for all certification conditions to establish the critical 
crack size, the required inspection method to detect the critical crack size, and the required 
inspection interval.  
 
3. Conduct a POD study and develop the inspection procedure that must be used to meet the 
requirements of the damage tolerance analysis. 
 
4. Change the orbiter operational procedures to implement the inspection requirements 
established by Recommendation 2. 
 
5. Perform a fatigue analysis for all certification conditions to estimate the fatigue life to crack 
initiation.  This establishes the safe life limit on the flowliners.  These results may be used in 
lieu of the damage tolerance approach (Recommendation 2) provided the results satisfy the 
requirements of NASA Standard 5001 and the NASA Fracture Control Board grants a waiver 
of the NASA Standard 5007.  
Finally, the ITA Team would like to commend the Program Team and their supporting 
contractors on their outstanding efforts to resolve this complex problem.  In addition, many of 
these individuals spent a significant amount of their time assisting the ITA Team in 
understanding this multifaceted issue.  
  
NASA Engineering And Safety Center  
Report 
Document #: 
RP-04-11/ 
04-004-E 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Orbiter LH2 Feedline Flowliner Cracking Problem 
Independent Technical Assessment (ITA) Report 
Page #: 
 9 of 132 
 
 
5.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM, PROPOSED SOLUTIONS, 
AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
In May of 2002, three cracks were found in the downstream flowliner at the gimbal joint in the 
LH2 feedline in OV-104. The gimbal joint was at the interface with the LPFP to the SSME #1 
(see Figure 5.0-1).  Subsequent inspections of the feedline flowliners in the other orbiters 
revealed a total of 11 cracks in the fleet.  The cracks extended from the drainage slots and were 
oriented in the axial or circumferential direction with respect to the flowliner shell (See Figure 
5.0-2).  Each orbiter had at least two cracks.  Cracks were located in either the upstream or 
downstream flowliner of the LH2 feedlines to engine #1 or engine #2.  No cracks were found in 
the LH2 feedline to engine #3.  Also, no cracks were found in the LO2 feedline flowliners.  In 
addition, one circumferential crack was found in the Main Propulsion Test Article (MPTA). 
Flowliner 
location 
 
Figure 5.0-1.  Schematic of the LH2 Feed System portion of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) 
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Cracks 
Axial Cracks          
Cracks 
Circumferential Cracks   
 
Figure 5.0-2.  Crack Locations and Orientation 
 
Over the course of the summer of 2002, a variety of methods were used to examine the Orbiter 
cracks. These methods included visual, mold impressions, eddy current, ultrasonic, photographic, 
x-ray, and acetate tape (though not all cracks were examined with all techniques). While most of 
these examinations included a measurement of crack length, no consolidation of results was ever 
published. This led to inconsistencies between the results. For example, OV-102’s three cracks 
have variously been reported as only partially across the ligament between slots and also as slot-
to-slot ‘through cracks’. In another example, the crack at slot 17 on OV-105 had a range of 
reported crack lengths between 0.186 and 0.6 inches. As all of the cracks have subsequently been 
repaired, further analysis of the cracks was impossible. 
 
Table 5.0-1 provides a summary of all the Orbiter cracks. Circumferential cracks emanated from 
the straight side of the slot and grew towards an adjacent slot. Axial cracks initiated from the 
rounded portions of the slots and grew, at least initially, towards either the free end or the 
assembly weld of the flowliner. OV-102’s flowliners, made of CRES 312, had 76 slots with a 
0.25 inch ligament length between slots. All other Orbiters’ flowliners were made of Inconel 718 
and had 38 slots with a 0.75 inch ligament length between slots. Reported crack lengths varied 
from 0.1 to 0.6 inches. 
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Table 5.0-1 
 
Orbiter Crack Summary 
Vehicle Material 
No. Of 
Flights 
Total 
Cracks 
Circumferential 
Cracks Axial Cracks 
OV-102 CRES 321 28 3 3 0 
OV-103 INCONEL 718 30 3 0 3 
OV-104 INCONEL 718 26 3 2 1 
OV-105 INCONEL 718 19 2 0 2 
 
After reviewing all available fleet crack data, some observations can be made: 
a. All circumferential cracks were located in the downstream flowliner on the assembly 
weld side of the slot (OV-102, OV-104). 
b. Only one axial crack grew towards an assembly weld (upstream flowliner, OV-103). 
c. All other axial cracks (5) grew towards the free edge of the flowliner (OV-103, OV-104, 
and OV-105). 
d. Some axial cracks exhibited a significant kink in their growth. The most pronounced was 
OV-105’s axial crack at slot 17 on the downstream flowliner (see Figures 5.0-3 and 
5.04). This crack was also the longest reported, 0.6 inches (as measured along its entire 
length). 
 
     
Figure 5.0-3     Figure 5.0-4 
Sketch of Axial Crack in OV-105 Photograph of Axial Crack in OV-105 
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e. Some cracks exhibited bifurcation (see Figure 5.0-5). 
 
 
Figure 5.0-5.   Crack Bifuricaton 
 
f. Some cracks exhibited branching (see Figure 5.0-6). 
 
 
Figure 5.0-6.  Crack Branching 
 
g. No axial crack reached the free edge or the assembly weld of the flowliners. 
h. No circumferential crack in the Inconel flowliners reached an adjacent slot. The longest 
reported circumferential crack in Inconel flowliners was 0.47” (ligament length 0.75 in.). 
i. While it is expected that the crack lengths on the inside and outside diameter of the 
flowliner would be different, reported results do not differentiate between the two. 
 
A compilation of the crack inspection data, provided by the Orbiter Program Office, is located in 
Appendix C-5. 
 
The functions of the gimbal joint flowliner are to 1) maintain smooth LH2 flow through the 
bellows area and into the LPFP and 2) to protect the bellows against flow induced vibration.  The 
flowliner is welded to the flange of the feedline gimbal (Figures 5.0-7 and 5.0-8) and BSTRA 
joints.  The flowliner is a thin shell structure about 12” in diameter and 0.050” in thickness. The 
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upstream flowliner is about 3.50” long and the downstream flowliner is 2.88” long.  The shell is 
perforated with numerous elongated slots about 1.0” by 0.25” (Figure 5.0-9).   The purpose of 
the slots is to allow access during manufacturing for clean-up and to release the propellant 
trapped between the flowliner and the bellows.  The flight critical issues related to the flowliner 
are disruption of the flow field leading to the LPFP cavitation, loss of flowliner structural 
integrity, and metallic foreign object debris (FOD) ingestion by the SSME.  
 
 
Figure 5.0-7.  MPS LH2 Feedlines Configuration 
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Flowliner inside Gimbal 
Figure 5.0-8.  Typical MPS LH2 Feedline 
 
 
Working throughout the Summer and Fall of 2002, a NASA/Contractor problem resolution team 
developed a solution to the crack problem and cleared the flowliners for one mission.  The 
solution included weld repair of all detectable cracks and the polishing of all slot edges (to 
remove manufacturing discrepancies that could initiate a new crack).  The flight rationale was 
based on a damage tolerance analysis of the flowliner for both the ‘with’ and ‘without’ weld 
repaired configurations.  The damage tolerance analysis used fracture mechanics to predict the 
service life of the flowliner assuming a detectable crack of 0.075” and a fatigue scatter factor of 
4 on the predicted life.  A so called “reverse” analysis was performed wherein the assumptions 
and approximations in the fracture mechanics analysis were established by fitting the analysis to 
the actual orbiter flight data for the known cracks.  The analysis predicted a service life of 8-12 
flights.  Therefore, this result supported a one-flight rationale with a scatter factor of 4 on the 
predicted fatigue life.  The repair solution was implemented and all orbiters were cleared for 
return to flight.  OV-104 flew mission STS-112 and OV-105 flew mission STS-113.  Post flight 
inspections did not find any cracks. 
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Bellows, located 
beneath the flowliner 
  
Figure 5.0-9.  Photograph and Schematic of Slots in Flowliners 
 
Even though the flowliner repair solution appeared to be successful, the NASA and contractor 
engineering community continued to investigate the problem.  This continuing investigation was 
motivated by the fact that the actual cause of the original cracks had not been conclusively 
established.  As part of the investigation, two engine hot fire test series were conducted.  The 
purpose of these tests was to better understand the feedline flow physics and the associated 
forcing functions, which define the spectrum loadings on the flowliner.  One test series used a 
simplified test article with a fixed joint and without a flexible bellow, hereinafter referred to as 
the battleship test article (BTA) and BTA test.  The second test article had a gimbal joint with a 
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flexible bellows, hereinafter referred to as the gimbal test article (GTA) and GTA test.  While the 
GTA was more like the flight hardware than was the BTA, neither test article exactly matched 
the orbiter feedline geometry.  Also, the test conditions did not fully simulate the actual orbiter 
flight environment.  The vibratory responses of both the upstream and downstream flowliners 
were measured during each test from strain gages mounted directly to the flowliners.  The test 
results were somewhat alarming because the vibratory strains (peak rms strains of over 300 
μstrain) measured on the heavily instrumented flowliners were considerably higher than 
anticipated.  In addition, there were some significant discrepancies between the results of the two 
tests. 
 
Using the results of the BTA and GTA tests, a new damage tolerance analysis, called a 
“forward” fracture analysis, was performed by the Boeing Company to predict the residual 
fatigue life of the flowliners.  The strain gage data recorded during the BTA and GTA tests were 
used conservatively to develop a loading spectrum to represent the “worst-case” nominal flight.  
Following the standard damage tolerance analysis procedure, the fracture mechanics analysis 
assumed that a crack of 0.075”, defined by the inspection crack detection limit, existed at the 
critical locations in the flowliner.  The predicted values of residual fatigue life were only 0.8 
missions for a circumferential crack in the upstream flowliner and 1.4 flights for a 
circumferential crack in the downstream flowliner.  These new results cast doubt on the validity 
of the flight rationale developed in 2002.   
 
Subsequently, the Orbiter Program Office sponsored an extensive effort to resolve this problem.  
Proposed solutions being pursued by the Program include developing a new flight rationale for 
the existing hardware and/or redesigning the flowliners and requalifying the LH2 feedlines.  In 
addition, there is considerable effort underway to refine the description of the flight environment 
and develop new loading spectra by conducting additional ground tests and analyses.  While the 
program-sponsored work to resolve the problem is incomplete, the NESC was requested to 
conduct an independent assessment of the problem and provide recommendations to the 
Program. 
 
David Hamilton, NESC Chief Engineer at JSC, presented the risk assessment of the flowliner 
cracking problem to the NESC Review Board on January 29, 2004.  The likelihood of 
occurrence and the consequences were assessed to be a 5x5 risk on the qualitative risk scale 
ranging from 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest likelihood and most severe consequences.  A PRA 
will be conducted as part of the ITA to quantify the risk of flowliner failure resulting in a SSME 
failure (see Section 7.8). 
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6.0 ITA PLAN 
The scope of the NESC flowliner ITA is to identify the primary contributors to the cracking in 
the flowliner and develop a strategy to resolve the problem and/or mitigate risks to acceptable 
flight levels.  The assessment is being conducted in two distinct phases.  Phase I assessed the 
problem and proposed a flight rationale.  Tests and analyses will then be conducted in Phase II to 
establish the validity of the flight rationale.  A two-phased approach to the assessment was 
pursued because the Orbiter Program Office requested that the NESC review their proposed 
problem resolution plan.  It was felt that a timely review by the NESC will validate the plan 
and/or identify alternate problem resolution paths.  
 
The objectives of Phase I were to fully characterize the flowliner cracking problem, identify 
constraints and establish the problem resolution space, and independently develop a problem 
resolution strategy.  The Phase I assessment was guided by the flow chart in Figure 6.0-1.  This 
flowchart documents the engineering actions required to determine the residual fatigue life of the 
flowliner.   After a review of the history of the problem, which included an independent analysis 
of the data from previously conducted tests, the ITA Team developed a problem resolution 
strategy including a logic framework for a flight rationale.  Tests and analyses were also 
conducted by the ITA Team in Phase I to facilitate the assessment.  Several of these tests and 
analyses will be continued in Phase II.  The ITA problem resolution strategy was compared to 
the problem resolution plans of the Program-sponsored team.  The Phase I findings and 
recommendations will be given to the Orbiter Program Office. 
 
Phase II will focus on independent tests and analyses conducted by the ITA Team to establish the 
efficacy of alternate problem resolution paths identified in Phase I.  The results of these tests and 
analyses will establish the validity of the flight rationale proposed in Phase I.  A PRA will 
establish the relative risk of the flight rationale for all operational conditions for which the 
flowliner must be certified.  Specific requirements to be implemented by the Orbiter Program to 
fulfill the flight rationale will be identified at the end of Phase II.  To ensure efficiencies where 
appropriate, the tests and analyses conducted during the NESC ITA will be coordinated with the 
activities of the team sponsored by the Orbiter Program Office. 
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Figure 6.0-1.  Phase I Assessment Flowchart 
 
Phase I Plan 
 
Phase I Objective:  Fully characterize the flowliner cracking problem, identify constraints and 
establish the problem resolution space, and independently develop a problem resolution strategy. 
 
Phase I Schedule: February 23, 2004 – July 20, 2004  
 
Key Milestones (date accomplished): 
February 19th:    Brief NRB on ITA Plan 
Week of March 1st:  In-Briefings to Orbiter and Shuttle Integration Offices 
May 28th:    Complete Phase I findings and recommendations 
Week of July 12th:   Brief NRB on Phase I findings 
Week of July 19th:  Brief Orbiter Program Office (PRCB) on Phase I findings 
 
Phase I Assessment Strategy: 
1. Establish a comprehensive characterization of the flowliner cracking problem and 
understand the actions underway or completed to resolve the problem. 
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2. Develop a logic flow diagram of the test/analysis method/procedure to determine residual 
life of the in-situ flowliner, showing the interfaces (input/output) between the disciplines. 
3. Compile the list of potential root causes (primary contributors).  Evaluate existing data 
and identify additional tests and analyses required to establish the controlling 
mechanisms and first order effects. 
4. Develop a fracture mechanics analysis tool (model) for both high cycle fatigue and low 
cycle fatigue to assess the effects of residual stress, loading spectrum, and the crack 
detection threshold.  Initiate deterministic and probabilistic sensitivity analyses to 
identify the first order effects on fatigue life. 
5. Develop a system level risk assessment tool, using the probabilistic risk analysis method 
as appropriate, and a risk mitigation/management plan. 
6. Assess the efficacy of nondestructive methods to measure the as-assembled residual 
stress field in the test articles and the Orbiter flowliners. 
7. Assess the efficacy of improved/refined nondestructive examination methods to reduce 
the inspection threshold for crack detection below the current threshold of 0.075 inch. 
8. Define the data required (tests and analyses requirements) to meet an acceptable flight 
rationale (e.g. inspect and fly). 
9. Using the above results, develop an integrated, comprehensive problem resolution 
strategy and propose a flight rationale. 
10. Compare the ITA strategy (1.9) to the “Orbiter Project Team” plan and identify similar 
findings, gaps, and alternate resolution paths. 
11. Compile the findings and recommendations for the Orbiter Project Office. 
 
Phase I Assessment Tasks: 
 
Structural Analysis 
1. Perform a finite element analysis to estimate the residual stresses in the flowliner due to 
manufacturing and develop a Phase II test plan to measure the residual stresses. 
2. Develop deterministic and probabilistic fracture mechanics models and predict the 
residual fatigue life. 
3. Develop a probabilistic fatigue life model and estimate the life to crack initiation.  
4. Perform finite element analyses of the flowliner to predict mode shapes and frequencies 
and to develop loading spectra for the fatigue and fracture analyses. 
5. Develop a Phase II test plan to conduct a laboratory test to verify fracture mechanics 
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crack growth models/methods. 
6. Evaluate surface enhancement treatments by conducting coupon tests under axial and 
bending fatigue loadings.  
 
Flow-Induced Dynamic Loads  
 
Using available ground test and flight data and CFD analyses, assess the following questions: 
1. How well do the various ground tests (air, water, and hot fire) simulate the flight 
environment? 
2. Do the CFD simulation results provide a realistic measure of the forcing functions for a 
particular flowliner resonance/excitation?      
3. Can the BTA/GTA instrumentation be improved?  
4. How significant are the acoustical effects of the feedline manifold and ducts? 
Risk Assessment 
1. Develop a system level risk assessment tool, using the probabilistic risk analysis method 
as appropriate and a risk mitigation/management plan.  
Nondestructive Inspection 
1. Establish the relative accuracy of portable, nondestructive methods to quantitatively 
measure the residual stresses in the flowliner due to the assembly weld and the crack 
repair welds.    
2. Identify and start to refine a method to inspect the flowliner for cracks that could reduce 
the threshold for detectable cracks to below the current threshold of 0.075 inch.  
3. Develop a method for inspecting the surfaces of the slots in the flowliner to characterize 
the in-situ surface (hole) quality.   
 
 
Phase II Plan 
 
Phase II Objectives:  
1. Conduct tests and analyses to establish the validity/efficacy of alternate problem 
resolution paths identified in Phase I and estimate the relative risks levels of the proposed 
flight rationale. 
2. Develop and verify improved nondestructive examination methods (NDE) to measure the 
in-situ state of the flowliners. 
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Phase II Schedule:  June 1, 2004 – September 30, 2004  
 
Phase II Tasks: 
 
1. Conduct a laboratory test to verify the fracture mechanics methodology for predicting 
crack growth due to resonant frequencies excited in the flowliner.  Residual stresses will 
also be measured in the test articles. 
2. Conduct laboratory tests to independently validate the crack growth rate data for Inconel 
718 at -423° F. 
3. Complete fatigue tests to verify efficacy of the edge replication method to detect insipient 
cracks in the flowliner. 
4. Participate in a study to establish the POD data to support the implementation of a high 
fidelity inspection method.  POD data must be generated for the edge replication method 
and the best conventional, automated nondestructive evaluation (NDE) method. 
5. Complete the study to establish the efficacy of the low plasticity burnishing (LPB) 
method as a viable surface enhancement treatment to significantly extend the fatigue life 
of the flowliners. 
6. Using the models and methods developed in Phase I, complete the deterministic and 
probabilistic fracture mechanics and fatigue life analyses of the flowliner and update the 
PRA of the flowliner/SSME failure modes of the Orbiter propulsion system for all 
certification cases necessary to support the flight rationale. 
7. The NESC will use the certification loading spectra developed by the Program.  
However, alternate approaches to the transfer ratio approximation will be developed and 
used in the analyses described in number 6 above. 
8. Several CFD analyses will be conducted to better understand the effects of various 
feedline components on the LH2 flow at 104.5 percent RPL. These components include 
the feedline’s 64 degree elbow, the BSTRA joint, the flowliner's bellows cavity, and the 
LPFP inducer.  
9. Steady State CFD analysis will be conducted to compare flight vehicle feedline flow with 
that of the E1 test stand arrangement.  
10. Wind tunnel testing will be conducted on two-dimensional models of the flowliner to 
establish slot edge tone excitation character (i.e., frequency and amplitude 
characteristics).  
11. Acoustic tests on a three-dimensional model of the flowliner assembly will be conducted 
to document bellows cavity resonance frequencies and mode shapes. Acoustic testing will 
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also be conducted on the three dimensional feedline models to ascertain the 
characteristics of the feedline.  
12. Scaled water flow tests on three-dimensional feedline models will be accomplished to 
measure the feedline velocity profile with a laser velocimeter. (These data will provide 
essential input to the CFD analysis described in numbers 9 and 10). 
13. Complete probabilistic risk assessment of the flowliner failure using updated input data 
from other Phase II tasks. 
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7.0  RESULTS OF THE ITA TESTS AND ANALYSES  
In this chapter, the results from the tests and analyses conducted by the NESC Flowliner ITA 
Team during the assessment will be presented and discussed.  The specific tests and analyses 
conducted by the team were previously listed in Chapter 6.  Chapter 7 contains only a brief 
description of each test or analysis along with the key results that lead directly to the 
observations and findings documented in Chapter 8.  A thorough description of the test and/or 
analysis methods and the complete results, including sensitivity studies, are located in the 
Engineering Reports provided in Appendix D of Volume II of this report.   
 
The loading environment is discussed in the first section of this chapter and is followed by the 
development of the fatigue loading spectra.  The next two sections present the cumulative 
damage results predicted by the fracture mechanics analysis and the fatigue life analysis using 
the fatigue loading spectra described in Section 2.  Section 5 describes the edge replication 
method, a high fidelity nontraditional inspection method, and section 6 discusses conventional, 
automated inspection methods.  The concluding section describes the system level PRA 
conducted to determine the impact of a flowliner failure on the risk of a SSME failure.   Provided 
below is the cross-reference between the sections of Chapter 7 and the appendices containing the 
detailed engineering reports: 
 
7.1 The Loading Environment (as described by flow physics) (Appendix D.1) 
 
7.2 Development of the Fatigue Loading Spectrum (Appendix D.2)  
 
7.3 Damage Tolerance (Fracture Mechanics) Analysis Methods and Results, Part I,   
(Appendix D.3) 
 
7.4 Damage Tolerance (Fracture Mechanics) Analysis Methods and Results, Part II,  
(Appendix D.3) 
 
7.5 Fatigue Life to Crack Initiation Analysis Methods and Results (Appendix D.4) 
 
7.6 Edge Replication Examination Method (Appendix D.5) 
 
7.7 Nondestructive Evaluation Methods for In-service Inspection (Appendix D.6) 
 
7.8 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (completely documented in Section 7.8) 
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7.1 The Loading Environment (As Described By Flow Physics) 
The transfer of LH2, from the External Tank (ET) to the SSMEs is accomplished through a 
vacuum jacket insulated duct system that includes numerous internal components and three small 
radius turns before reaching the inlet to the SSME’s low pressure fuel pump (LPFP).  Also, the 
fuel lines must be able to contract and rotate as the temperature changes when the fuel is loaded.  
The flexibility is provided at several ball strut tie rod assembly (BSTRA) joints and at the gimbal 
joint which is located at the down stream end of the feedline and is attached to the inlet of the 
LPFP. 
 
Typical conditions of the fuel for a 104.5 percent power level are a mass flow rate of 154.7 
lbm/s, at a temperature of 37oR.  The temperature increases slightly, during ascent, as the heat 
load to the ET warms the LH2, which rises to the top of the hydrogen tank.  Figure 7.1-1 shows a 
typical temperature profile.   
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Figure 7.1-1.  Typical Prediction of the LH2 Temperature Profile 
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The total pressure (Po) at the LPFP inlet varies during ascent as it is a function of the hydrogen 
tank ullage pressure, the height of hydrogen in the tank, the acceleration along the flight path, 
and the losses in the fuel line system between the ET and the SSME.  Figure 7.1-2 shows typical 
total pressure values which range from 35 to 22 psi for a nominal ascent.   
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Figure 7.1-2.    Typical Predictions of Feedline Total Pressure 
 
 
The density of the mean flow is 4.4 lbm/ft3, which yields an average velocity of 45ft/s and a 
dynamic pressure of 1 psi.  Reynolds Number, based on the 12-inch diameter of the feedline, is 
around 21 million. 
 
Significant perturbations to the static pressure are caused by cavitation of the LPFP inducer 
blades and reverse flow from the blade tips.  The tip speed is 825 ft/s which produces a very high 
dynamic pressure at the tip (relative to the mean flow) of around 330 psi.  Additionally, strong 
acoustic modes could occur due to resonances caused by the internal feedline geometry and the 
geometry of the cavity between the flowliners and the surrounding pressure bellows.   
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The cavity acoustic response will be sensitive to the speed-of-sound in the cavity, which can 
change significantly if two phase flow occurs in the cavity.  Figure 7.1-3. shows how 
dramatically the speed-of-sound is reduced as a function of mixture ratio, alpha.  Vapor can enter 
the cavity either from cavitation of the inducer which is convected in by the reverse flow, or 
direct boiling of the hydrogen at the wall due to heat transfer into the cavity. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1-3.  Speed-of-sound for Two Phase Hydrogen vs. Void Fraction, Alpha 
 
 
7.1.1 Complex Environment 
The gimbal joint flowliners are embedded in a complex environment that is not completely 
understood.   The first example is cavitation which still must be investigated empirically.  
Rigorous theoretical based modeling techniques which can be used to produce consistent results 
for cavitating inducers do not exist.  Thus, the cavitation aspect of this problem, which is 
significant, must be measured in a test.  The second example is heat transfer into the flowliner 
bellows cavity.  The flight environment, from this standpoint, is not known.  Figure 7.1.1-1 
shows the downstream end of the LH2 feedline gimbal joint.  Structural support for the feedline 
and the LPFP is provided by the large titanium ‘horseshoe’ structure that is bolted to slightly 
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over half of the circumference of the gimbal joint flange.   A heat transfer analysis that could 
estimate the temperatures in the bellows cavity during ascent (including conduction through this 
component) is not readily available.  This analysis is needed before it will be possible to design a 
ground-based test, which provides the proper heat transfer into the gimbal joint. And finally, 
knowing the correct geometry is essential for several reasons.  The upstream duct elbows and 
internal components add large scale unsteady motions to the mean flow while the length (and 
geometry) change the acoustic modes and wall boundary layer profile.  The reverse flow from 
the inducer tip is very sensitive to the tip clearance and wall velocity profile.  Apparently, the tip 
clearance is not completely understood either, as the LPFP inducer rubs the pump housing during 
some portion of the flight.  Also, the weld beads that were left in the flight gimbal joints and that 
were in the GTA, but not in the BTA, further complicate the situation.  Their effect on the 
boundary layer and thus the inducer tip flow interaction has not been investigated yet. 
 
 
 
 
 
Horseshoe Structural 
Attachment 
Figure 7.1.1-1.  Gimbal Joint Downstream End and Orbiter ‘Horseshoe’ Structural 
Attachment 
 
Another possible complication is the observation that the flowliner cracks appear to line up with 
the centerline of the horseshoe attach structure.  Figure 7.1.1-2 shows the crack locations added 
to a drawing of the gimbal joint for Engine #1.  The numbers correspond to the Orbiter, while 
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blue represents a crack in the downstream flowliner, near the inducer, and green shows the crack 
location in the upstream flowliner. 
 
 
Centerline of horseshoe attachment 
 (vertical orientation) 
Figure 7.1.1-2. Engine #1 Crack Locations for OV-103, OV-104, and OV-105.  Blue is the 
downstream flowliner, while green is the upstream flowliner. 
 
Engine #2 only has one crack, which is on the upstream flowliner, for the Orbiters that have 
Inconel flowliners as shown in Figure 7.1.1-3.  Columbia had three cracks, all on the 
downstream flowliner of Engine #2, as shown in Figure 7.1.1-4.  Recall that the flowliners on 
Columbia were the original 76 slot design and were made from CRES, not Inconel. 
 
While these patterns might not be significant, they indicate that there could be a correlation 
between the gimbal joint thermal and structural environment that has not been fully evaluated.  
As an example, the inducer tip clearance might not be uniform which would result in an 
amplitude variation for both the reverse flow and cavitation effects. 
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Centerline of horseshoe attachment 
(horizontal orientation)  
 
Figure 7.1.1-3.  Engine #2 Crack Location on the Upstream Flowliner for OV-105 
 
 
Centerline of horseshoe attachment 
(horizontal orientation)  
Figure 7.1.1-4.  Crack locations on Engine #2 on the Downstream Flowliner of OV-102 
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7.1.2 A-1 Test Stand 
Figure 7.1.2-1 shows the A1 test stand duct which was fabricated in the early 1970s to test the 
SSME.  The internal components, elbows, and duct length are quite different from the Orbiter 
feedline system.  Thus, the approach flow wall boundary layer, velocity profile, acoustics, and 
unsteady component to the mean flow will be different from the Orbiter.  These differences need 
to be assessed to understand the differences between the test results and flight. 
 
Figure 7.1.2-1.  Stennis Space Center, A-1 Test Stand LH2 Feedline Drawing 
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7.1.3 Correlating Test Stand Data to Flight 
It should go without saying that accurate measurements of temperature and pressure, along with 
fuel flow rate, pump speed, etc., are essential to correlating the test stand results with flight.  The 
accuracy of the measurements needs to be reviewed, as the pressure measurements on the 
Orbiter, upstream of the gimbal joint and at the flow rate meter between the two fuel pumps are 
known to have accuracy issues.  The test stand measurement may also be of concern. 
 
The gimbal joint outer shell is an Inconel assembly that is composed of two flanges at each end, 
which are welded to an inner cylindrical shell. The two flowliners are also welded to the inner 
shell.  Thus, there are four circumferential welds whose weld bead is visible on the inner face of 
the gimbal joint.  Figure 7.1.3-1 shows the downstream weld bead which joins the F1 flange to 
the inner shell.  There is also a smaller weld bead where the flowliner is welded to the shell.  Part 
of the smaller bead can be seen in the light from the flashlight.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.1.3-1.  Downstream Weld Bead is clearly visible in this photograph of an LH2 
Gimbal Joint for Engine #1 
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A flowliner on OV-102 is shown in the figure and is thought to be typical of the fleet.  However, 
considerable variation among the fleet flowliners has been reported.   The downstream weld bead 
is close to the inducer and will cause local separation of the approaching flow and the reverse 
flow from the inducer blade tips.  The upstream weld bead will also cause local separation of the 
approaching flow, and the reverse flow, if it reaches that far upstream.  The smaller weld beads 
at the attachment of the flowliners might affect the acoustical tones caused by the slots, when the 
flow crosses the weld bead before crossing the slot.   
 
Arrowhead Products fabricated the original gimbal joints and the GTA.  The weld beads were 
left as welded.  Based on a verbal description, the GTA had larger weld beads than the flight 
gimbal joints.   
 
In contrast to the GTA, the BTA was fabricated at Stennis Space Center, where the interior 
dimension is routinely machined to an inner diameter of 12.07 inches.  Thus, this machining 
removed the weld beads that joined the end flanges to the test article.  The upstream half of the 
test article can be seen in Figure 7.1.3-2 which shows a smooth surface from the upstream end of 
the test article to the small weld bead at the flowliner attachment. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1.3-2.  Upstream Half of the BTA 
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Recent CFD results by Dan Dorney show a significant effect due to the downstream weld bead at 
the LPFP’s 4N frequency.  The weld bead results show a much larger pressure oscillation than 
the smooth wall calculations.  This difference will be further investigated during Phase II.   
 
7.1.4 CFD Analysis 
Three high resolution CFD grid systems have been created to provide insight into the complex 
flow field which results from the interaction of the gimbal joint flowliners and the inducer back 
flow.  The INS3D code is used to compute the unsteady flow field as described in Appendix D.1.  
The liquid hydrogen is treated as an incompressible viscous fluid.   In spite of the progress made 
in multi-phase simulations in recent years, cavitation modeling remains to be extremely 
challenging and is not mature enough to be used for predicting flow physics in a consistent 
manner, thus the simulation does not include any cavitation effects. 
 
Model I 
Model I simulates the “straight duct” test run on the A1 test stand, which did not include the 
gimbal joint.  A 48-inch long straight duct grid system is joined to the inducer grid system which 
includes the correct bull nose hub geometry and all eight blades of the inducer (4 long, 4 short 
blades).  The inducer tip clearance of 0.006 inches is included in the model.  The resulting 
pressure variations, due to the reverse flow, are in good agreement with the measurements 
obtained on the A1 test stand during Test 901-940, as shown in Figure 7.1.4-1. 
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7.1.4-1. Time History of Static Pressure during One Inducer Rotation (Model I, 9th inducer 
rotation), and Min/Max values of pressure in Hot Fire Test 
 
The CFD results show peak-to-peak pressure variations of between 10 to 15 psi for the 9th 
rotation of the inducer while the test data for the same power setting of 104.5 percent and high 
NPSP show similar magnitudes over about 50 seconds worth of test data. 
 
Model II 
The grid system for Model II includes the gimbal joint geometry built from the CAD 
representation of the flowliner and bellows cavity.  Figure 7.1.4-2 shows the surface grids of the 
inducer, the flowliner slots, along with a cross section through the bellows cavity. 
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Figure 7.1.4-2.   Surface Grids for LPFP Inducer and the Liquid LH2 Flowliner 
 
A close up of the bellows cavity is shown in Figure 7.1.4-3.  The flowliner slots are resolved 
with 5 grid points across the thickness of the flowliner. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1.4-3.  Details of the Flowliner Bellows Cavity Showing the Overset Grid System 
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The pressure distribution on the inducer blades, for the 5th rotation, at a power level of 104.5 
percent is shown in Figure 7.1.4-4.   The low pressures are shown in blue, while the red and 
magenta show high pressures.  The suction side of the blade faces upstream, toward the reader.   
 
 
 
Figure 7.1.4-4.  Inducer Pressure Distribution for the 5th Rotation 
 
Figure 7.1.4-5 shows the reverse flow (in blue) entering the bellows cavity through the overlap 
between the two flowliners.  The flow entering the cavity has a velocity of about 10 to 15 percent 
of the inducer tip speed. 
 
 
Figure 7.1.4-5. Axial Velocity Contours at an Instantaneous Time In Cut Planes Showing 
Reverse Flow In Blue 
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The CFD results appear to be modeling the fluid mechanics in a very acceptable manner and 
illustrate how complex the interaction is between the inducer reverse flow and the flowliner 
geometry.  Please refer to the full report in the appendix for further details of the flow through 
the flowliner slots.  A comparison of the unsteady pressures will be made to the BTA and GTA 
pressure measurements, once a time periodic solution has been obtained. 
 
Model III 
The third grid system is an extension of Model II, and includes the 64 degree elbow of the Type 
II feedline for Engine #1 and the BSTRA that is downstream of the elbow.  The grid system has 
been created, but the solution has not been started at the time of this report. 
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7.2 Development of the Fatigue Loading Spectra 
Review of the Load Spectra Development 
The development of the Shuttle MPS LH2 feedline flowliner’s load spectra was reviewed.  The 
liners under investigation are the two flowliners immediately upstream of the SSME’s LPFP.  
The load spectra are used to describe the load-time history of the liners during flight operations, 
and these spectra are used in durability analyses of the liners to determine the liners expected 
lives.  The objective of the review was to understand the methodology and assumptions that were 
used to generate the load spectra.  This review encompasses the development of the ‘first-
generation’ or ‘Boeing’ load spectra presented in Figure 7.2-1 and Table 7.2-1 for the upstream 
flowliner and Figure 7.2-2 and Table 7.2-2 for the downstream flowliner.  These load spectra are 
not certification load spectra.  Certification spectra will be generated by the Program-sponsored 
team for the certification conditions specified by the Orbiter Program Office.  The ‘Boeing’ load 
spectra represent a reasonable effort to generate a conservative loading that envelops the ‘worst-
case’ flight loads of a typical flight. 
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Figure 7.2-1. ‘Boeing’ Upstream Load Spectrum For Crack-Site B 
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Figure 7.2-2. ‘Boeing’ Downstream Load Spectrum For Crack-Site B 
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Table 7.2-1. Upstream Flowliner Load Spectrum Parameters 
 
Designation ‘Boeing’ Load Spectrum [Warren] 
Liner Upstream 
Crack Location ‘B’ 
Mean Stress 70 kpsi 
Modulus 31.2 Mpsi 
  
 
Block 
Duration 
(sec) 
Frequency 
(Hz) Mechanism 
Load 
Factor 
Scale 
Factor 
Transfer 
Ratio 
Alternating 
Stress 
(kpsi rms) 
1 32 3500 Edge tone or cavitation (C9ND) 1 0.8 2.9 23.2 
2 4 3500 Edge tone or cavitation (C9ND) 1 0.8 2.9 10.1 
3 15 3500 Edge tone or cavitation (C9ND) 1 0.8 2.9 10.9 
4 4 3500 Edge tone or cavitation (C9ND) 1 0.8 2.9 10.1 
5 72 3500 Edge tone or cavitation (C9ND) 1 0.8 2.9 15.2 
6 317 3500 Edge tone or cavitation (C9ND) 1 0.8 2.9 9.0 
7 52 3500 Edge tone or cavitation (C9ND) 1 0.8 2.9 10.1 
8 7 3500 Edge tone or cavitation (C9ND) 1 0.8 2.9 8.3 
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Table 7.2-2. Downstream Flowliner Load Spectrum Parameters 
 
Designation ‘Boeing’ Load Spectrum [Warren] 
Liner Downstream 
Crack Location ‘B’ 
Mean Stress 70 kpsi 
Modulus 31.2 Mpsi 
  
 
Block 
Duration 
(sec) 
Frequency 
(Hz) Mechanism 
Load 
Factor 
Scale 
Factor 
Transfer 
Ratio 
Alternating 
Stress 
(kpsi rms) 
1 32 10600 Pump backflow 4N (5ND) 4 1 0.6 15.0 
2 4 3330 Edge tone (C4ND) 1.2 0.8 3 15.7 
3 15 3330 Edge tone (C4ND) 1.2 0.8 3 24.7 
4 4 3330 Edge tone (C4ND) 1.2 0.8 3 15.7 
5 72 1070 Pump backflow 4N (5ND) 4 1 0.6 15.0 
6 295 1650 Edge tone or cavitation (3ND) 1 1 1.2 8.24 
7 32 1650 Edge tone or cavitation (3ND) 1 1 1.2 2.81 
8 52 3330 Edge tone (C4ND) 1.2 0.8 3 9.0 
9 7 3330 Edge tone (C4ND) 1.2 0.8 3 23.4 
 
 
The methodology used by Boeing to develop a load spectrum for each flowliner is semi-
empirically based, and it is complicated by the complexity of the loading environment during 
flight operations.  The load spectrum development is further complicated by engine variability, 
flight profile differences, and the variability of the structural characteristics of the liners 
themselves.  The consensus hypothesis is that the liners are subject to combined static and 
dynamic loading originating from residual manufacturing loads, static and quasi-static flight 
loads, and dynamic flow induced loads.  Currently, there is no analysis tools or test facilities that 
can directly replicate the flight loading conditions seen by the flowliners.  In addition, there are 
no in-situ flight load or response measurements to directly provide load spectra or verify 
analyses and tests.  The methodology developed is a direct result of these handicaps and the 
types of information available at this time.  The principal information source is the engine hot 
fire testing performed using several feedline/flowliner simulators (straight duct, BTA, and GTA).  
Other sources of information include LPFP acceleration data obtained from the Development 
Flight Instrumentation flown during the Orbital Flight Test, SSME performance data obtained 
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from each Shuttle flight, design information, and fluids, structural, thermal, and acoustics 
modeling of the MPS parts. 
 
The methodology used by Boeing is anchored by performing investigations (analytical and data-
mining) into determining and understanding the loading mechanisms observed during the engine 
hot fire tests and anecdotally observed from Development Flight Instrumentation flown during 
the Orbital Flight Test.  Historical fleet engine performance data are used to determine the 
sequencing and timing of loading events.  These loading events and engine conditions are 
correlated to the engine hot fire test data, and strain data are extracted and combined with the 
liner’s structural dynamics model to determine the magnitude (stress) associated with the loading 
event.  Load uncertainty factors and scale factors are used to scale up or down the recovered 
stresses such that the loads are conservative but realistic (within engineering judgment).  Finally, 
the cyclic distribution of the loading event is computed by scaling a normalized Rayleigh 
distribution to fit the load magnitude and frequency of the loading event.  Each loading event is 
temporally assembled to create the final load spectrum. 
 
Specific summary observations are provided below. 
 
1. The flowliners are subject to a combined static and dynamic loading environment.  The 
static loads originate primarily from residual manufacturing loads.  The dynamic loading 
is driven by the local flow effects of the LPFP.  The primary sources of dynamic loading 
are backflow from the pump, cavitation, and acoustic effects driven by the flow field. 
2. Due to engine-to-engine variability, environmental factors, and flight profile differences, 
a deterministic load history cannot be created for a ‘typical’ flight.  The Program has 
adopted a methodology to create a maximal or ‘worst-case’ load history to be used for the 
certification of the flowliners.  The ‘Boeing’ load spectra represent a first cut attempt to 
derive the ‘worst-case’ load spectra for a typical flight.  There is no provision for off-
nominal events.  Conservative factors include, but are not limited to: 
a. All damage accumulates at one location independent of loading condition. 
b. Load factors are used to scale loads up to account for uncertainty or to scale loads 
down to account for obvious over-conservatism. 
c. During a loading segment or block, if a resonance condition is found to exist, it is 
assumed to exist throughout the event.  There is no relief due to changing 
conditions, i.e., de-tuning. 
3. Since there are no direct flight measurements to provide load spectra or verify analyses 
and tests, the flowliner load spectra are determined in a semi-empirical fashion from 
circumstantial analyses and tests.  Central to the load spectra development is the BTA and 
GTA testing performed at the Stennis Space Center.  Flow phenomena observed in 
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BTA/GTA tests are assumed representative of the fleet.  Strains associated with liner 
events are extracted from the BTA/GTA data, and structural dynamics models are used to 
relate the measured strains to the crack-site strains (transfer ratio).  There are three 
practices that violate the concept of a conservative loading spectrum: 
1. The transfer ratio approach mandates several assumptions that may not be 
conservative.  For example, the transfer ratio method requires an a priori 
knowledge of what liner modes are reacting to the excitation loads.  If the mode 
selection is in error, then the transfer ratio is incorrect.  There would be no 
guarantee of conservatism. 
2. Both alternating and bending stresses are assumed to act in bending; there is no 
accounting for membrane stress.  For some structural modes, the membrane stress 
is the dominant stress.  By not incorporating membrane stress there is no 
guarantee of conservatism. 
3. Initial load spectra were developed using an assumption that the cycle counting of 
the liner response would follow a Rayleigh distribution.  This is contradictory to 
the assumption/observation that the liner’s response is characterized as narrow-
banded resonant response.  The Rayleigh distribution is insufficient in 
representing the cycle counts from a narrow-band process. 
 
Complete details of this assessment are provided in Appendix D.2.1. 
Development of Loading Spectra for a Nominal Flight 
As part of the loading spectra assessment, the NESC ITA Team developed loading spectra for a 
nominal flight using the BTA test data.  The nominal flight is the STS-110 Engine #1. The 
engine data received consists of two sets: (1) time vs. Q/N and power level and (2) cavitation 
parameter Nss vs. Q/N.  Power and Q/N versus time is shown is Figure 7.2-3.  The underlying 
critical assumption in the development of loading spectra is that flow-induced test strain 
responses are flight-like responses.  However, it should be noted that test trajectories map partial 
flight trajectories in the Nss vs. Q/N plane.  The hot fire tests were not meant to simulate a 
particular flight or portion of it. 
 
The process followed to define the loading spectrum for the nominal flight is as follows: 
1. The Nss vs. Q/N nominal flight trajectory is divided into 7 blocks of time or events.  The 
rationale for this division is that hot fire test trajectories will be compared with these 
flight trajectories and provide the basis to extract test strain responses that would 
correspond to that segment of the flight.  Values of Nss vs. Q/N for flight STS-110 and 
the selected blocks are shown in Figure 7.2-4 (B1 being ‘lift off to 104 percent’ and B7 
‘3G down’). 
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2. Test trajectories that map blocks of flight trajectories in the Nss vs. Q/N plane are 
identified within the BTA runs 955 to 958 (strain gage instrumented).  Figure 7.2-5 
shows the nominal flight and the BTA runs 955-958. 
3. Test time intervals are obtained for each flight block.  Table 7.2-3 summarizes flight and 
test time start, end, and intervals for each block. 
4. Loading spectra are calculated for strain gages that are selected because they showed the 
highest RMS responses during the test time interval identified. The selected strain gages 
were D9.5 and D47 for the upstream and B132 and B161 for the downstream flowliner 
from various BTA runs. 
The main differences with the Boeing “worst case nominal loading spectra” approach are as 
follows: 
1. The lift-off event for the ITA spectrum is split into two blocks.  This is because there 
are two different zones in terms of Nss vs. Q/N for the lift-off and the crack growth 
has been demonstrated to be very sensitive to the initial loading. 
2. The flight power level (FPL=104 percent) is kept as one trajectory instead of two 
trajectories (with and without the solid rocket boosters).  This is because there is a 
single mapping in terms of Nss vs. Q/N for this portion of the flight; and the presence 
of the solid boosters does not seem to relate directly to the high frequency flow 
induced loads in the liners. 
3. In the NESC ITA approach, the following rationale is used: 
The entire data block is analyzed, not just the 0.4 second interval that contained the 
highest response. The resulting load spectrum is adjusted to the flight condition by 
scaling the number of counts in each load level from the test block duration to the 
flight segment duration.  For example, the counts in a 4 second test block are 
multiplied by 8 to create a 32 second flight block. 
4. The bucket, or block 4, is not represented by any BTA trajectory.  Boeing’s run/strain 
gages have been used for the bucket block.  
 
Finally, none of the BTA runs fully map a flight trajectory in terms of Nss vs. Q/N, the selection 
of strain gages and time intervals would have been the same even if the so called “nominal 
flight” had been chosen from another flight or engine. In other words, any loading spectra 
developed for a nominal flight would be very similar.  In this respect, the loading spectra 
produced for this “nominal flight” would envelope any variation of flights and engines so long as 
the trajectories map “within reason” in the Nss vs. Q/N plane.  Trajectories such as 109% power 
level would probably not fall “within reason” and would not be covered by these loading spectra. 
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Refer to Appendix D.2.2 for complete details on this analysis. 
 
 Power Level, Q/N time profiles- STS-110, ME-1
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Figure 7.2-3.   Power Level, Q/N time Profiles - STS-110, ME-1 
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Snoopy Tracking, STS-110, Engine #1 - Blocks 1-7
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Figure 7.2-4. Snoopy Tracking, STS-110, Engine #1- Blocks 1-7 
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Figure 7.2-5.  STS-110 #1 and BTA 955-958 
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Table 7.2-3.  Flight and Test Time Intervals 
 
 Block # Flight Event / BTA Run# Start Time End Time Total Time
1 Lift Off to 104 % 0 12 12
955 4 10.4 6.4
956 4 10.4 6.4
957 4 10.4 6.4
958 4 10.4 6.4
2 104 % pre ramp down 12 38.5 26.5
955 422.4 454.4 32
956 122.4 162.4 40
957 82.4 134.4 52
958 122.4 138.4 16
3 ramp down 38.5 43.5 5
956 518.4 580.4 62
957 282.2 342.4 60.2
5 ramp up 52.5 59 6.5
955 478.4 520.4 42
957 334.4 346.4 12
6 accelerated 59 448.5 389.5
955 260.4 290.4 30
956 154.4 182.4 28
957 222.4 274.4 52
957' 362.4 394.4 32
958 554.4 598.4 44
7 3G down 448.5 509.5 61
956 202.4 262.4 60
956' 314.4 374.4 60
957 662.4 725.2 62.8
958 642.4 725.2 82.8
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Determination of Transfer Ratios 
An independent technical assessment of the initial Boeing transfer ratios was performed.  The 
“transfer ratio” is the strain ratio between a crack location and a measured strain gage location 
for a specific mode shape of interest.  (The modes of interest are those included in the fatigue 
loading spectrum).  Figure 7.2-6 is a sketch of part of a flowliner showing the crack sites of 
interest. The transfer ratios are approximate attempts to use strain gage measurements at mid-
ligament locations to infer strain at the crack locations at the edges of the slots, called A, B, C 
and D.  The measurements come from strain gages on either the BTA or the GTA.  The strain 
gages were placed on the outside (OD) surface of the flowliners at the mid-ligament location 
between slots as illustrated in Figure 7.2-6. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2-6. Two flowliner slots showing potential crack sites A B C and D and two strain 
gage locations used in tests (not to scale)
 
 
Transfer ratios are computed from the finite element models (FEM) originally assembled by 
Marshall Space Flight Center.  However, the original finite element mesh has been changed to 
improve the accuracy of the NESC ITA transfer ratios.  The model was enhanced by replacing 
the triangular elements at the slot edges with QUAD-4 elements and making coincident the 
nodes of the springs at the boundary between shell and weld.  The latest models have been 
verified by the modal survey test, but still do not match the flowliner hardware exactly.  (See 
Appendix D.2.4 for details).  This is because (1) the model remains an approximation (despite 
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significant efforts), and (2) each flowliner in the STS Orbiter is slightly different. Figure 7.2-7 
shows the Upstream Flowliner FEM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2-7.  The Upstream Flowliner FEM 
 
Transfer ratios are computed from the equations provided below.   
 
The components of strain are defined as follows: 
 εSG,M,L is the average strain over the assumed area covered by the strain gage 
SG   = strain gage 
M     = mode number 
L      = location (ligament 1-38) 
 
εA,M,L,Edge is the point strain tangential to the edge of the slot at a crack site 
 A      = site (A, B, C or D) 
 Edge = inside (ID) or outside (OD) diameter 
 
The transfer ratio is defined as: 
 TRA,M,Edge= (Maximum of εA,M,L,Edge over all L and both edges) / 
(Maximum of εSG,M,L over all L) 
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The bending and membrane components are then computed by the following relationships: 
 
 TRA,M,Bending   = 0.5 ( TRA,M,OD – TRA,M,ID ) 
 TRA,M,Membrane = 0.5 ( TRA,M,OD + TRA,M,ID ) 
 
The transfer ratio is determined from the maximum strain from all BTA gauges. Also, the crack 
site with the highest strain is the location used in the fracture mechanics analysis.  However, 
these two locations (the site of maximum strain and the site of the crack of interest) do not 
usually occur at the same slot number of a flowliner. 
 
The transfer ratios for the mode shapes of interest are compiled in Table 7.2-4.  It is interesting to 
note the large membrane component for many of these factors. It is essential to define both the 
bending and membrane components because fracture mechanics analysis treats each one 
differently.   Before the transfer ratios compiled in this table were computed, it was assumed that 
bending would dominate, and, in fact, was the only term used in the early analyses of crack 
growth.  The results are compared to the existing Boeing data that have been used for initial 
fatigue analysis.  
 
Table 7.2-5 shows that for all modes, the current factors are larger than the Boeing values.  This 
increase is most likely due to three causes.  First, the maximum strain is found over 38 slots, 
inside or outside diameter, and for B and C, two locations per slot. Second, the strain in the 
denominator is averaged over the area covered by a gauge. Third, the improved finite elements at 
the slot result in higher values of strain than the original FEM mesh. 
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Table 7.2-4.  The Transfer Ratios for a Few Modes 
 
 
Transfer Ratios: Bending / Membrane 
FEM 
Nat. Freq. 
(Hz) 
 
Mode 
Shape Site A Site B Site C Site D 
Upstream Flowliner   
3136 C9 ND -0.31 / 
1.29 
-1.91 / 
1.58 
1.43 / 
1.65 
1.79 / 
0.89 
3556 Shear -0.54 / 
7.53 
-2.06 / 
9.00 
-0.87 / 
9.77 
-0.33 / 
7.33 
      
Downstream Flowliner   
1337 5 ND -0.16 / 
0.51 
0.14 / 
0.53 
0.61 / 
0.31 
-0.03 / 
1.17 
2150 3 ND -0.17 / 
0.85 
-0.03 / 
1.35 
0.50 / 
0.96 
-0.09 / 
1.34 
3283 C9 ND -0.52 / 
1.37 
0.99 / 
2.22 
-1.80 / 
1.89 
-3.30 / 
2.56 
3514 C4 ND -0.60 / 
1.62 
-0.91 / 
2.50 
1.65 / 
-1.64 
0.98 / 
3.01 
      
 
Table 7.2-5. Comparison to the Boeing Data 
   TRMAX = Maximum TR at either ID or OD 
    TR at OD = TRBENDING + TRMEMBRANE  
    TR at ID = TRBENDING – TRMEMBRANE  
Max Transfer Ratio 
At Site B 
 
FEM 
Nat. Freq. 
(Hz) 
 
 
Mode 
Shape 
By Swales By Boeing 
[2] 
Upstream Flowliner 
3136 C9 ND 3.49 2.90 
Downstream Flowliner 
1337 
2150 
3514 
5 ND 
3 ND 
C4 ND 
0.67 
1.38 
3.41 
0.6 
1.2 
2.4 
 
Complete details on the determination of the transfer ratios are provided in Appendix D.2.3. 
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Development of Fatigue Loading Spectrum Using Rainflow Method 
Several spectra, including Boeing’s, have been assessed for various cases and have been used as 
inputs to fracture mechanics analyses performed by the ITA Team.    
 
A preliminary look at the process that Boeing followed to generate loading spectra was 
determined to be conservative.  For example, for the upstream liner, Boeing divided the entire 
flight into 8 time intervals (blocks), for each block the worst RMS strain gage response was 
obtained based on a 0.4 second interval.  In this case, a total of 0.4*8 = 3.2 seconds of the worst 
responses was used to determine the loading spectra for the 500 seconds of flight. This means 
~0.6 percent of the worst test responses to represent the full powered flight.   
 
The validity of the assumption that the response of the liner is single modal was investigated 
through a frequency analysis of the strain gage data.  While several flight blocks did record a 
single frequency dominated liner response (see Figure 7.2-8), which probably indicates a single 
modal response of the structure, several blocks included wide-band strain activity that is not 
indicative of a single modal response (see Figure 7.2-9).  Because the Boeing-developed transfer 
ratios are based on the assumption of a single modal response, these results indicate that 
additional work analyzing the modal response characteristics of the flowliners was necessary. 
Such work is currently in progress. 
 
The NESC ITA Team selected the rainflow method of cycle counting to develop the fatigue 
loading spectra.  The rainflow method is a standard way to develop fatigue load spectra, has been 
used for over 20 years by almost all aerospace firms, and is applied here to the BTA/GTA test 
data.  Though the results are termed the “load spectrum”, it is in reality just the number of cycles, 
assumed to be fully reversible, at each strain level.  There is no frequency definition either real or 
implied.  An example of a Rainflow-generated loading spectrum is shown in Table 7.2-6. Each 
column of data represents a unique segment of the nominal flight profile that is defined by the 
conditions recorded during the test and expressed by the parameters Nss (cavitation), Q/N (flow 
rate) and RPL (relative power level).  The nominal flight profile shown includes seven segments, 
or blocks, while the Boeing cases were comprised of eight blocks for the upstream liner and nine 
blocks for the downstream liner. 
 
Rainflow-generated loading spectra was performed and delivered to the ITA for the following 
cases: 
a) Upstream and Downstream Flowliners: 0.4 seconds (comparison with Boeing). 
b) Upstream and Downstream Flowliners: 1.0, 4.0 seconds.  This was a sensitivity study 
centered on the Boeing generated spectra. 
c) Upstream and Downstream Flowliners: Nominal Flight for two strain gages per liner, 
described in the previous section. 
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Complete details of the development of the fatigue loading spectra are located in Appendix 
D.2.4. 
 
 
Table 7.2-6. Nominal Profile Using The Rainflow Method for the Shuttle Upstream 
Flowliner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2-8.   Frequency Response of Downstream Flowliner 
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Figure 7.2-9.   Frequency Response of Upstream Flowliner 
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7.3 Damage Tolerance (Fracture Mechanics) Analysis Methods and Results 
 
Part I:   Sensitivity Study based on the Transfer Ratio Approximation Method  
The objectives of the NESC ITA fracture mechanics study were to use and develop as needed 
fracture mechanics tools to assess the effects of residual stresses, loading spectra, and crack 
detection threshold on the fatigue life of the liners and independently verify the Boeing and 
Marshall fracture mechanics analyses. This section describes the sensitivity analyses performed 
to identify the first order effects on residual fatigue life of the flowliners.  Fracture mechanics 
analyses of the upstream and downstream flowliners were performed for the circumferential 
cracks at location B.  (See Figure 7.2-6).  The focus of the current study was on location B 
because all preliminary investigations indicated that this location was the crack location that 
controlled the fatigue life of the flowliners.  The residual fatigue lives were evaluated for 
circumferential quarter-circle corner cracks using the NASGRO computer code.  These corner 
cracks were assumed to have initial crack lengths of 0.075, 0.020, or 0.005 inches on the outside 
diameter (OD) side of the flowliner at slot location B.   The stress-intensity factors from the 
literature for the corner crack and through crack configurations were blended to develop the 
stress-intensity factors for the crack configurations considered herein.  Residual (mean) stresses 
of 70, 50, or 30 ksi were assumed at location B.  Three material models for crack growth were 
used.  These are the Baseline (using various R-ratios curves in the da/dN - ΔK data), 
Intermediate (using only R = 0.9 growth data), and Conservative (growth data obtained using ΔK 
threshold by extrapolating Paris regime lines to 10-9 in./cycle) material models.  Inconel 718 
crack growth rate data obtained from tests in liquid nitrogen (LN2 @ -320° F) and liquid helium 
(LHe @ -423° F) were used.  Results were calculated for three NESC spectra, previously 
discussed in Section 7.2, and developed using the rainflow cycle counting method. 
 
The engineering report presenting the complete details of the fracture mechanics analysis 
methods, sensitivity studies, and results is located in Appendix D.3.1.  Only the results from the 
fracture mechanics analyses are presented in detail in this section.   
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Assumptions in the Current Analyses 
The following assumptions are made in the analyses that are presented in this section: 
 
1. Residual stresses are assumed to have a value of 70 ksi at location B, which is constant 
across the ligament between the slots.  The residual stresses do not get relieved and have 
the same value of 70 ksi as the crack grows. 
2. The alternating component of loading is fully reversed. 
3. A single mode is predominant in each block of the loading; however, the predominant 
modes can vary from block to block. 
4. In each block, modal interaction effects are not considered.  
5. For each loading block, the peak stress is assumed to occur at the crack site. 
6. Load cycles within each block of a spectrum are ordered from high to low.  The load 
interaction effects are neglected. 
7. Stresses at the edge of the slot in the liner model and at the edge of the slot in the flat 
plate fracture model are the same.  That is, the effects of curvature are negligible. 
8. The curved plate model subjected to remote tensile loading responds locally similar to 
the model subjected to remote dynamic loading. 
9. All remote membrane and bending loading cases yield the same value of KT at the edge 
of the slot.  The value of KT for flat and curved plates subjected to the same remote 
loading is the same. 
10. The transfer ratio does not change as the crack grows.   
11. Load ratio effects can be neglected; crack growth rate behavior is obtained from R = 0.9 
data.  (This is discussed in more detail later in this section). 
12. Small crack effects are negligible for the crack lengths considered. 
13. It is assumed that the initial crack size is detectable. 
14. Cracks initiate as quarter-circle corner cracks and grow as quarter-circle corner cracks 
until the crack depth reaches the flowliner thickness.  Subsequently, cracks grow like 
part-elliptic through cracks.  The part-elliptic through cracks can be approximated to 
through cracks with straight crack fronts.   
15. The transition from a corner crack to a through crack is instantaneous. 
16. The stress-intensity factors for quarter-circle corner cracks (with crack-depth equal to 
crack-length) can be obtained using Newman-Raju equations with Zhao modifications.  
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17. Crack growth is governed by Mode I deformations.  Mode II and Mode III contributions 
can be neglected. 
18. Failure is assumed to occur when the ligament between the slots is completely cracked 
(i.e., c = 0.75 in.).  The number of cycles to crack the ligament between slots is nearly 
the same as the number of cycles required to grow the crack from its initial size to a 
length of 0.6 in. 
Loading Spectra used in the Fracture Mechanics Analysis: 
Using the BTA/GTA strain gage database and a rainflow counting procedure, the NESC 
developed three spectra.  The development of these loading spectra was previously described in 
Section 7.2.  In this section, these spectra will be referred to as the NESC Spectrum-1, NESC 
Spectrum-2, and NESC Spectrum-3.  NESC Spectrum-1 was developed from the Boeing loading 
history as described in Section 7.2.1.  Two versions have been used in the fracture mechanics 
analysis.  One version is the original Boeing spectra with only a bending transfer ratio and the 
second version, referred to as the NESC Spectrum-1, uses the rainflow cycle counting method 
and separates the transfer ratios into membrane and bending components.  NESC Spectrum-2 
and Spectrum-3 were developed by the NESC for a nominal flight (see Section 7.2.2, to compare 
to the original Boeing spectra).  Spectra-2 and –3 also use the rainflow cycle counting method 
and separate the transfer ratios into membrane and bending components.  The three spectra are 
qualitatively compared in the plots provided in Figure 7.3-1 (a) through (d).  In these figures, the 
alternating components of the membrane and bending stress for the upstream and downstream 
flowliners are plotted as a function of the mission time.  
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(a) Upstream Membrane 
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(b) Upstream Bending 
 
Figure 7.3-1 (a and b).  Comparison of NESC Spectra 1, 2, and 3 
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(c) Downstream Membrane 
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(d) Downstream Bending 
Figure 7.3-1 (c and d). Comparison of NESC Spectra 1, 2, and 3 
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Crack Configuration Models 
The only complete physical evidence of the crack shape is a crack from a MPTA downstream 
flowliner that was destructively broken open and characterized.  The complete fractography of 
this crack is described in Appendix C.3.   Figure 7.3-2 is a photomicrograph of this crack.  The 
crack initiated at a scratch on the outer diameter (OD) of the slot near the location where the 
radius of the slot intersects the straight side.  The beachmarks on the fracture surface (see Figure 
7.3-2) indicate that the crack evolved as a near quarter circle corner crack, (i.e., with a/c = 1), 
then continued as an elliptic through-the-thickness crack. 
 
ID OD
c
a
ID OD
 
Figure 7.3-2.  Photomicrograph of the MPTA Crack 
 
Under pure bending loading, the inner diameter (ID) is under compressive loading and the crack 
shape will quickly evolve from a quarter-circle corner crack into a part-elliptic crack with a high 
aspect ratio.  Under pure membrane loading, the crack will grow faster in the thickness and again 
will evolve into a non-uniform aspect ratio part-elliptic crack.  The actual crack shape depends 
on the amount of membrane and bending components in the loading.  The MPTA article shows 
that the crack grew as a quarter-circle corner crack and grew like a part-elliptic through crack at 
about c= 0.075 in.  The MPTA crack shapes thus strongly suggest the existence of membrane 
loading in addition to the bending loads. 
Three crack configurations are considered (Crack Configuration-1, Crack Configuration-2, and 
Crack Configuration-3), and are presented in Figures 7.3-3 through 7.3-5.  Crack Configuration-
1 assumes an initial corner crack on the OD side with a = c = 0.005 in. as shown in Figure 7.3-3. 
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The crack is assumed to grow like a quarter circle corner crack with a/c = 1 until it reaches the 
thickness and transition into a through-the-thickness crack with a crack length of c = 0.05 in.  
The crack is then assumed to grow like a through-the-thickness crack.  This crack configuration 
is assumed in the NESC ITA analyses. 
c = 0.005 c = 0.05
a = 0.005
Corner Crack
Through Crack
ID
OD  
Figure 7.3-3.  Crack Configuration-1 
Crack Configuration-2 assumes an initial corner crack on the OD side with a = 0.045 in. and c = 
0.02 in. as shown in Figure 7.3-4.  This crack is then assumed to grow along the OD as an elliptic 
corner crack until the c length reaches 0.3 in.  At c = 0.3 in., the crack is assumed to transition 
into a through crack and grow like a through-the-thickness crack.  This crack configuration is 
used in the Marshall analyses [1]. 
c = 0.02 c = 0.3
a = 0.045
Elliptic Crack Through Crack
ID
OD
 
Figure 7.3-4.  Crack Configuration-2 
Crack Configuration-3 assumes an initial corner crack on the OD side with a = c = 0.005 in. as 
shown in Figure 7.3-5.  The crack is assumed to grow like a quarter-circle corner crack with a/c 
= 1 until it reaches 90 percent of the thickness (i.e., until a = 0.045 in.).  After this point, the 
crack is assumed to grow along the OD until a length of c = 0.3 in.  At c = 0.3 in., the crack is 
assumed to transition into a through-the-thickness crack.  This crack configuration was also used 
in the NESC ITA analyses. 
c = 0.3c = 0.005
a = 0.005
Corner Crack Elliptic Crack Through Crack
ID
OD
 
Figure 7.3-5.  Crack Configuration-3 
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NASGRO Life Prediction Model 
The life prediction code NASGRO Version 4.11 [2] is used for all crack growth predictions.  The 
stress-intensity factors are entered using a 1-D data table (DT01) option.  The user dimension, D, 
is 0.75 in. (the width between the slots).  The spectra are entered as separate load cases for mean 
bending, alternating bending, and alternating membrane.  The load cases are superimposed in 
NASGRO during the life calculations.  All life calculations are performed using the NASGRO 
non-interaction model to ensure the most conservative life calculations.  The non-interaction 
model performs linear accumulated damage crack growth and deactivates plasticity induced 
retardation models.  Failure is defined as crack growth through the ligament.  The difference in 
life between c = 0.6 in. and through the ligament is negligible. 
Material Models (Fatigue crack growth rate data)  
This section describes the material models used in the fracture mechanics analyses and the life 
calculations.  The LH2 flowliners operate at a temperature of -423ο F.  However, at the beginning 
of the ITA, Inconel 718 data only at LN2 temperature of -320ο F was available.  Figure 7.3-6 is a 
plot of the Inconel crack growth rate vs. stress intensity factor (da/dN vs. ΔK) data at LN2 (-320ο 
F) and the NASGRO equation constants [2].  Personnel at NASA MSFC completed FCG testing 
of Inconel 718 at -423ο F using a liquid helium testing process [3].  Figure 7.3-7 is a plot of the 
Inconel da/dN vs. ΔK data at -423ο F and the NASGRO equation constants.  The -423ο F crack 
growth rate behavior is less severe than the -320ο F data.  The intrinsic threshold of the -423ο F 
data (ΔKth = 7 ksi .in ) is more than twice that of the original -320ο F data (ΔKth = 3 ksi .in ).  
The threshold shift will significantly increase the predicted life calculations by reducing the 
number of above-threshold (damaging) load cycles and reducing the amount of damage caused 
by the cycles that are above threshold.  All life calculations were performed using IN 718 data at 
-320ο F and at -423ο F. 
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Figure 7.3-6.  Inconel 718 da/dN vs. ΔK data at LN2 (-320° F), Baseline Material Model 
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Figure 7.3-7.  Inconel 718 da/dN vs. ΔK data at (-423° F) 
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Results and Discussion   
Results are presented for the circumferential cracks at location B.  Based on the physical 
evidence from the crack in the MPTA, Crack configuration-1 (see Figure 7.3-3) is chosen for the 
crack growth calculations.  When the residual stresses are combined with the dynamics induced 
loading, the net stress at the ID side is always compressive.  However, the MPTA article shows 
that the crack grew as a quarter-circle corner crack (with a/c = 1) and grew like a part-elliptic 
through crack at about c = 0.075 in.  The MPTA crack shapes thus strongly suggest the existence 
of membrane loading in addition to the bending loads.  With all the evidence that is available, the 
conservative choice for the crack configuration is Crack configuration-1 and hence is chosen in 
the present analysis.   
Results for the Upstream Flowliner using the original Boeing Spectrum (the baseline) 
The upstream liner was analyzed first for bending only, using the -320° F (Baseline) material 
model.  First, the life calculations were performed using the Boeing loading spectrum and an 
initial crack length of 0.005 in., Crack configuration-1, and 70 Ksi mean stress. The calculated 
crack length-cycles curve for this configuration is presented in Figure 7.3-8.  From this curve, the 
life of the flowliner was calculated using Boeing’s assumptions (with the final crack length of 
0.6 in. and a NDE threshold of 0.075 in. [4]) to be 0.8 missions.  These calculations agree exactly 
with those in reference 4.  While this type of life calculation is standard in damage tolerance 
analyses where the loading spectrum is repeated several times (like in a typical aircraft wing 
spectra), there appears to be no justification for evaluating the life of the liner in this fashion for 
a severe loading spectrum like the present Boeing spectrum.  The crack length-cycle calculations 
were repeated assuming an initial crack length of 0.075 in., and the results are presented in 
Figure 7.3-9.  The life is significantly lower, about 0.2 missions. 
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Figure 7.3-8.  Crack Length:  Cycles Curve vs. Flights for the Upstream Liners (Boeing 
Loading Spectrum, 70 ksi mean stress, with ci = 0.005 in.) 
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Figure 7.3-9.  Crack Length: Cycles Curve vs. Flights for the Upstream Liners with ci = 
0.075 in. 
 
 
The calculations were repeated with the Marshall-developed spectrum, Crack configuration-2, 
and 70 ksi mean stress.  A life of 0.3 missions was computed and the results agree exactly with 
the calculations made by Rayburn [1].  In summary, the present analyses have reproduced both 
the Boeing and Marshall results with their respective loading spectra and assumptions. 
 
Results of the Sensitivity Studies: 
 
Life predictions were made using three different initial crack lengths (ci = 0.075, 0.02, and 0.005 
in.), the Boeing loading spectrum (bending loading), and the three NESC spectra.  The effects of 
various parameters on the life of the upstream liner were studied for these three crack lengths.   
Throughout this report, the calculated lives are reported to two significant figures and are for 
comparison purposes only.  The truncated integer part of the life number should be used. 
 
Effect of Mean Stress:  The first parameter studied is the effect of mean stress.  Three mean 
stress values of 70, 50, and 30 ksi were considered, as shown in Table 7.3-1.  The table shows 
that there was marginal effect as the mean stress was reduced from 70 ksi to 50 ksi and a 
significant improvement in life as the mean stress was reduced from 50 to 30 ksi. 
 
  
NASA Engineering And Safety Center  
Report 
Document #: 
RP-04-11/ 
04-004-E 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Orbiter LH2 Feedline Flowliner Cracking Problem 
Independent Technical Assessment (ITA) Report 
Page #: 
 69 of 132 
 
 
Table 7.3-1.  Life of the upstream liner:  Boeing Loading Spectrum, Baseline material 
model, Crack configuration-3 
 
Mean Stress, ksi Initial crack length, in. 
70 ksi Mean Stress 50 ksi Mean Stress 30 ksi Mean Stress 
0.075 1.0 1.3 3.0 
0.020 1.2 2.0 4.0 
0.005 1.9 2.3 5.1 
 
 
Effect of Material Models:  The effect of material models on the life of the flowliner was 
considered.  Table 7.3-2 presents the calculated life of the flowliner for the three material models 
considered.  As seen from this table, the baseline material model predicts longer life than the 
Intermediate and Conservative models.  As expected, the Conservative material gives the 
shortest lives because the ΔK threshold was lowest for this model.  As mentioned previously, 
when the loads are well characterized, the baseline model produces unconservative results and 
hence hereafter, the intermediate material model is used.   
 
Table 7.3-2.  Life of the upstream liner:  Boeing Loading Spectrum, 70 ksi mean stress, 
Crack configuration-3 
 
Material Models Initial Crack Length, in. 
in. Baseline Intermediate Conservative 
0.075 1.0 1.0 0.4 
0.020 1.2 1.0 1.0 
0.005 1.9 1.1 1.1 
 
 
Effect of Loading Spectra:  Next the NESC Spectrum-1 was used in the life calculations.  Table 
7.3-3 compares the results of the NESC Spectrum-1 with the Boeing spectrum.  Note that the 
Boeing spectrum results were obtained with Crack configuration-3, while the NESC Spectrum 
results were obtained with Crack configuration-1.  Also, note that the Boeing spectrum is based 
on the Rayleigh distribution while the NESC spectra are based on the rainflow counting 
procedures.  Both calculations use 70 ksi mean stress and intermediate material models with LN2 
data. 
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Table 7.3-3.  Comparison of calculated life with Boeing and NESC Spectra: Intermediate 
material model, 70 ksi mean stress 
 
Initial crack length, in. Boeing Spectrum NESC Spectrum-1 
0.075 1.0 0.9 
0.020 1.0 1.1 
0.005 1.1 2.0 
 
As seen from this table, the NESC spectrum gave a longer life for an initial crack length of 0.005 
in., while the lives were nearly the same (barely one mission) for the two longer initial crack 
lengths.  Thus, the prediction of residual life is highly sensitive to small changes in peak stresses 
in the loading spectrum.  Figure 7.3-10 presents the amount of damage in each of the loading 
blocks for the first flight of the spectrum for the 0.005 in. initial crack length, NESC Spectrum-1 
case in Table 7.3-3.  The highest damage was in block 5 followed by blocks 6 and 1.  Most of the 
damage was caused in blocks 1, 5, 6, and 7; the contributions from the remaining blocks were 
insignificant. 
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Figure 7.3-10. Damage Plot with Boeing and for NESC Spectra 1: Intermediate material 
model, 70 ksi mean stress 
 
 
Effect of LN2  (-320ο F) vs. LHe data  (-423ο F):  The upstream liner case was analyzed with 
both LN2 and LHe data utilizing the NESC Spectrum-1, and the computed lives are compared in 
Table 7.3-4.  The LHe showed a (ΔK)th of 7 ksi-in.0.5 a considerable improvement from the LN2 
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data threshold of about 3.5 ksi-in.0.5.  As expected, the life increased significantly when the LHe 
data was used and can be attributed to the increase in the (ΔK)th with the LHe data.   
 
 
Table 7.3-4.  Calculated life for upstream liner; NESC Spectrum-1, Intermediate material 
Model, 70 ksi mean stress 
 
Crack Growth Data Initial crack length, in. Crack Growth Data LN2 (-320° F) Crack Growth Data LHe (-423° F) 
0.075 0.9 2.0 
0.020 1.1 3.9 
0.005 2.0 7.0 
Summary of Results for the Upstream and Downstream Flowliners 
Table 7.3-5 summarizes the results from all sensitivity studies discussed above for the upstream 
and downstream.  It should be noted that the evidence is conclusive that both the upstream and 
downstream flowliners were excited by complex modes that include both membrane and bending 
loads.  An initial crack length of 0.005 in. was also included in Tables 7.3-1 to 7.3-4 to study the 
effect of reducing the initial crack size.  However, this crack size could be below the long crack 
threshold and may require a small crack analysis methodology.  Therefore, the results 
summarized in Table 7.3-5 only include the longer crack lengths where small crack effects are 
not an issue. (See Appendices D.3.1 and D.3.2 for further discussion of small crack 
methodology). 
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Table 7.3-5.  Summary of Life Calculations for Circumferential Crack B* 
(Based on the transfer ratio approximation method) 
NESC Spectrum-2 
(Gage D47)
NESC Spectrum-3 
(Gage D95)
-320° F -423° F -423° F -423° F -423° F
Initial Crack 
Length, in Bending Bending Bending + Membrane Bending + Membrane Bending + Membrane
0.075 0.9 2.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
0.02 1.1 3.9 0.3 0.1 1.0
NESC Spectrum-2 
(Gage D47)
NESC Spectrum-3 
(Gage D95)
-320° F -423° F -423° F -423° F -423° F
Initial Crack 
Length, in Bending Bending Bending + Membrane Bending + Membrane Bending + Membrane
0.075 0.6 2.0 0.1 5.2 2.2
0.02 1.1 3.6 0.2 10.0 4.2
NESC Spectrum-1 
(Boeing Loading History)
NESC Spectrum-1 
(Boeing Loading History)
Upstream Liner
Downstream Liner
 
 
The following observations/conclusions can be drawn from the results in Table 7.3-5: 
 
1. The LHe data gives longer lives than the LN2 data. 
2. While longer life for the downstream liner is produced with NESC Spectra-2 and -3, the 
life of the upstream liner is significantly lower with Spectrum-2.  
3. The lives of both the upstream and downstream flowliners are significantly reduced when 
both the membrane and bending loading are considered.  Hence, using only the bending 
loading rather than the combined membrane and bending loadings leads to erroneous 
and unconservative conclusions regarding lives.   
4. The calculated lives for the upstream flowliner shown in Table 7.3-5 are inconsistent with 
the fleet cracking data.  However, the lives calculated for the downstream flowliner are 
somewhat consistent with the fleet cracking data.  In general, smaller lives are predicted 
for the upstream liner compared to the downstream liner.  The flight data shows five 
circumferential cracks (out of the total 11 cracks found), all in the downstream liner at 
location B.  This suggests that the loading considered in the upstream flowliners is a 
conservative loading.   
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Alternate Modeling and Analysis Approach  
Because the fatigue loading spectra are predominantly due to flow-induced vibration, the fracture 
mechanics analysis must be directly integrated with the structural dynamics analysis.  In this 
section, a transfer ratio approach (an engineering approximation) is used to relate the mid-
ligament strains measured in the BTA test to the crack initiation sites at the edge of the slots.  A 
more rigorous alternate approach is to use a three-dimensional/shell finite element analysis that 
couples the crack growth kinetics directly to the structural dynamics.  This approach, described 
in detail in the next section, does not require the use of transfer ratios.   
Conclusions from the Sensitivity Study using the Transfer Ratio Approximation Method   
Based on sensitivity analyses the following conclusions were reached. 
 
1. Predicted values of residual fatigue life are sensitive to the small changes in the 
alternating component in the loading spectrum when bending loading is considered.  For 
the same magnitude of the alternating stress component, the residual (mean bending) 
stress has to decrease to 30 ksi before significant change (by more than a factor of 2) in 
the residual life can be realized. 
 
2. The degree of knowledge in the current loading spectra is insufficient to account for the 
crack closure effect.  Hence, the use of intermediate material model with R=0.9 where 
ΔK = ΔKEffective is recommended. 
 
3. The predicted life of the liners depends on the assumptions of the crack shape 
configuration.  From the MPTA test article, fatigue cracks appear to initiate as corner 
cracks and grow nearly circular in shape to reach the thickness and grow subsequently as 
part through elliptic cracks.  This crack growth configuration is conservatively modeled 
in the current analysis. 
 
4. Inconel 718 exhibits an increase in ΔK threshold value with decreasing temperature.  This 
effect is very beneficial to the life of the flowliner. 
 
5. Decreasing the crack detection size will increase life.  However, this effect is small for 
the severe loading spectra that are considered in this assessment.  Decreasing the initial 
crack size below the current NDE limit of 0.075 in. to 0.02 in., or even to 0.005 in., does 
not yield significant increase in the life of the flowliners.       
 
6. Membrane and bending components are operational in both upstream and downstream 
liners.  The fracture mechanics analyses show that the predicted values of life are 
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significantly affected by the membrane component.  Neglecting membrane component 
yields lives that are highly unconservative. 
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7.4 Damage Tolerance (Fracture Mechanics) Analysis Methods and Results 
 
Part II.  Three-Dimensional Shell Analysis, Coupled Fracture Mechanics and Structural 
Dynamics 
 
Approach for Stress-Intensity Factors 
A transfer ratio approach for calculating stress-intensity factors is presented in Section 7.3.  A 
more rigorous dynamics-based approach that is based on the full liner shell model is presented in 
this report.  This approach will be hereinafter termed as the shell-dynamics approach.  In this 
approach, a shell model of liner with a crack is used.  Dynamic analysis of the shell is performed 
first.  The representative mode of excitation in the shell is identified.  For each particular shell 
mode, the strain energy release rates at the crack-tip are calculated.  The stress-intensity factors 
are then evaluated from the strain energy release rates. 
Shell-Dynamics Approach 
In this approach, the stress-intensity factors at the crack-tip in the liner are directly evaluated 
using the deformed mode shapes that the liner experiences.  Thus, this approach eliminates the 
transfer ratio and the associated assumptions and is more rigorous than the transfer ratio 
approach.  The details of the shell-dynamics approach are described below. 
A shell finite element model of the complete liner is developed first.  A typical shell model is 
shown in Figure 7.4-1.  Using this model, a modal analysis is performed to isolate the mode 
shapes for the upstream liner (C9ND mode shape) and the downstream liner (3ND, C4ND, and 
5ND mode shapes).   
Upstream Liner:  Consider the upstream liner and the C9ND mode shape.  The deformed shape 
of the upstream liner, based on the eigen-vector corresponding to this mode shape, is shown in 
Figure 7.4-2 along with a schematic of the locations of maximum mid-ligament and location B 
strain.  Typical values of the normalized axial stress (i.e., Young’s modulus (E) multiplied by the 
axial strain) at the mid-ligament locations are plotted in Figure 7.4-3 for all of the ligaments in 
the liner.  As expected, the distribution shows a certain amount of cyclic symmetry for the C9ND 
mode shape.  Similarly, the axial stresses at location B of all the slots are examined and the slot 
with the highest stress at location B is isolated.  (There may be more than one slot with the same 
peak stress.  In such a case, any one of those slots is chosen).  In Figure 7.4-3, the slot with the 
highest axial stress is at ϕ = 340°.  A circumferential crack of length (c) is introduced at this slot.  
A new shell finite element model with the crack is developed and re-analyzed. 
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 (a) Typical full liner model (b) Typical refined mesh near the crack 
Figure 7.4-1.  Typical Shell Finite Element Model 
     
Crack Location
(maximum Location B strain)
Far Field
Mid-Ligament
Location
 
Figure 7.4-2. Far Field Ligament for Scaling the Eigen-Value Results 
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Figure 7.4-3.  Typical Normalized Axial Mid-Ligament Stress for the C9ND Mode Shape 
Again, the C9ND mode shape is isolated.  The eigen-vector corresponding to this mode shape is 
scaled at the mid-ligament location to quantify the deformations in the shell.  This scaling 
process requires a far field mid-ligament location to be identified. As mentioned above, the crack 
was inserted at the slot with the highest axial stress at location B (ϕ = 340°).  Three mid-ligament 
locations had nearly the same peak value, so the scaling is based on the peak mid-ligament that is 
farthest (ϕ = 180°) from the slot with the crack.  This location is used to scale all deformations 
and forces for each crack length analyzed. 
Stress-intensity Factors  
The stress-intensity factors are calculated from the strain energy release rates using virtual crack 
closure techniques as shown in Figure 7.4-4 [1, 2].  In this figure, Fx, Fy, and Fz are the respective 
forces at the crack-tip node in x, y, and z directions;  Mx, My, and Mz are the respective moments 
about x-, y-, and z-directions; ux, uy, and uz are the respective displacements at a node behind the 
crack-tip along the x-, y-, and z- directions; and  θx, θy, and θz are the respective rotations at a 
node behind the crack about the x-, y-, and z- directions.  B is the thickness of the shell and Δc is 
the length of the element behind the crack tip.  The finite element models had a fine mesh in the 
crack region with same size of the elements behind and ahead of the crack tip (element size Δc= 
0.005 in, as shown in Figure 7.4-4). 
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Figure 7.4-4.  Schematic showing crack tip coordinate system and energy 
release rate equations [2] 
The stress-intensity factors are calculated from the energy release rates as shown in Equation 
7.4-1, a-c, where E is Young’s modulus. 
KI =  IEG    (EQ. 7.4-1a) 
KII = IIEG    (EQ. 7.4-1b) 
KIII = IIIEG    (EQ. 7.4-1c) 
In addition, a total stress-intensity factor is calculated from the total energy release rate as shown 
in Equation 7.4-2. 
KTOTAL = ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ++ IIIIII GGEEG γ  (EQ. 7.4-2) 
This approach (EQ. 7.4-2) to calculating an equivalent total stress-intensity factor based on the 
total energy release rate was proposed by Potyondy et. al. [3] for a shell analysis, and they 
suggest that a value of γ = 1 yields conservative K-values.  Hence, γ = 1 is adopted here. 
Figure 7.4-5 is a plot of stress-intensity factor versus crack length calculated for the upstream 
liner.   For each crack length, the C9ND mode shape is isolated and the stress-intensity factors 
are calculated from the energy release rates. The values presented in this figure are scaled to a 
unit value of far field mid-ligament stress.  For crack lengths in the range of 0 < c ≤ 0.3 in., 
Mode I is nearly constant and is dominant.  The Mode III contributions increase with increasing 
crack length.  For crack lengths c > 0.3 in., the Mode III component increases and is about equal 
to the Mode I component.  The Mode II component is insignificant.   
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Figure 7.4-5.  Stress-intensity Factors for the Shell-Dynamics Model for the 
C9ND mode 
The stress-intensity factors from the shell-dynamic analysis (Figure 7.4-5) are compared in 
Figure 7.4-6 to those obtained using the transfer ratio approach.  The shell-dynamics Ktotal curve 
is the same as in Figure 7.4-5, and the transfer ratio values are also computed using a mid-
ligament stress of unity and use the transfer ratio values consistent with the updated shell-
dynamics model.  The stress-intensity factors from the shell-dynamic analyses are significantly 
lower than those obtained from the transfer ratio approach, suggesting that the transfer ratio 
approach is overly conservative.  As expected, the values from the two approaches converge as 
the crack length decreases.  The largest crack length considered in the shell-dynamic analysis for 
this comparison and for the life predictions was 0.3 inch because longer crack lengths exhibited a 
considerable Mode III component of the stress-intensity factor.  The material data used to 
characterize crack growth behavior was derived from Mode I crack growth rate tests and would 
not necessarily be appropriate for Mode III dominate crack growth.  Most of the life is consumed 
while the crack is a corner crack (or short through-the-thickness crack) so stopping the life 
prediction at 0.3 inches is conservative, yet makes little difference to the overall life. 
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Figure 7.4-6.  Comparison of Shell-Dynamics and Transfer Ratio Stress-intensity Factors 
for the C9ND Mode with Unit Stress Loading at the Far Field Mid-ligament 
Both the transfer ratio and shell-dynamics approaches will converge to the same values as the 
crack size decreases.  The smallest crack size considered for the shell-dynamics approach is 
0.025 inch (filled square symbols in Figure 7.4-6).  Thus, the shell-dynamics Ktotal stress-
intensity factor was extrapolated to blend in with the transfer ratio curve at a crack length of 
0.005 inch. 
Several factors appear to be contributing to the difference in the stress-intensity factors in Figure 
7.4-6.  Recall that a flat and a cylindrical plate model (with the same curvature as the liner) with 
seven slots was analyzed and reported in Section 7.3.  The plates were assumed to be fixed on y 
= 0 and have symmetric boundary conditions on x = +3.5 in. and along straight edges in the 
curved models.  The plates were subjected to remote axial loading (see Appendix D.3.1, Figure 
D.3.1-11). The stress-intensity factors for various crack lengths from the two models are 
marginally different (less than one percent).  This suggested that the effect of curvature of the 
shell is insignificant for remote tensile loading.  A similar argument can also be made for remote 
bending loading.  In the shell-dynamics approach, modal deformations (3 displacement and 3 
rotations) at each node (of the FE model) of the shell are prescribed.  These deformations are 
significantly different from the deformations of a curved cylindrical shell subjected to 
remote tension and bending loads.  This prescription of modal deformations at each node is 
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likely stiffening the shell and this stiffening is not reflected in the models used with the transfer 
ratio approach.  The stiffening of the shell is reflected in lowering of the stress-intensity factors.   
Downstream Liner:  The analysis presented in the foregoing for the upstream liner is repeated 
for the downstream liner.  Recall that in the downstream liner there are three modes, 3ND, 
C4ND, and 5ND, that are active.  The stress-intensity factors are calculated for various crack 
lengths using the shell-dynamics approach for the three modes and are presented in Figures 7.4-7 
through 7.4-12.  As in the upstream liner, the calculations are performed only up to a crack 
length of 0.3 in.  In these figures, the contributions (KI, KII, and KIII) to the Ktotal are shown along 
with the stress-intensity factors obtained using the transfer ratio.  For all three modes, the shell-
dynamics approach yielded stress-intensity factors lower than those calculated using the transfer 
ratio approach.  The difference between the shell-dynamics approach and the transfer ratio 
approach is more pronounced for the 3ND and C4ND modes than for the 5ND mode. 
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Figure 7.4-7.  Stress-intensity Factors for the Shell-Dynamics Model for the 
3ND Mode 
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Figure 7.4-8.  Comparison of Shell-Dynamics and Transfer Ratio Stress-intensity Factors 
for the 3ND Mode with Unit Stress Loading at the Far Field Mid-ligament 
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Figure 7.4-9.  Stress-intensity Factors for the Shell-Dynamics Model for the 
C4ND Mode 
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Figure 7.4-10.  Comparison of Shell-Dynamics and Transfer Ratio Stress-intensity Factors 
for the C4ND Mode with Unit Stress Loading at the Far Field Mid-ligament 
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Figure 7.4-11.  Stress-intensity Factors for the Shell-Dynamics Model for the 
5ND mode 
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Figure 7.4-12.  Comparison of Shell-Dynamics and Transfer Ratio Stress-intensity Factors 
for the 5ND Mode with Unit Stress Loading at the Far Field Mid-ligament 
Results  
The shell-dynamics Ktotal stress-intensity factor was input into NASGRO.  In addition, the 
loading spectra were recalculated as mid-ligament stresses rather than crack site stresses.  These 
new results were then used to calculate fatigue lives for the both liners at location B.  Tables 7.4-
1 and 7.4-2 summarize the fatigue crack growth analyses run using the shell-dynamics stress-
intensity factors.  All of results use the intermediate material model at -423° F.  The transfer ratio 
results from Appendix D.3.1 are included in the tables for comparison.  As expected, significant 
improvement in lives is obtained with the new shell-dynamics approach.  Note that the smallest 
crack size considered is c = 0.02 inch. 
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Table 7.4-1. Predicted Number of Flights Using the Shell-Dynamics Stress-Intensity 
Factors for the Upstream Liner at Location B 
 
ci (inch)
Transfer 
Factor 
Approach 
(flights)
Shell-
dynamics 
(flights)
Transfer 
Factor 
Approach 
(flights)
Shell-
dynamics 
(flights)
Transfer 
Factor 
Approach 
(flights)
Shell-
dynamics 
(flights)
0.075 0.1 21 0.0 11 0.2 35
0.020 0.3 39 0.1 21 1 72
*Intermediate Material Model at -423° F
NESC Spectrum-1 
(Boeing Loading History)
NESC Spectrum-2 
(NESC Loading History)
NESC Spectrum-3 
(NESC Loading History)
 
 
Table 7.4-2.  Predicted Number of Flights Using the Shell-Dynamics Stress-Intensity 
Factors for the Downstream Liner at Location B 
 
ci (inch)
Transfer 
Factor 
Approach 
(flights)
Shell-
dynamics 
(flights)
Transfer 
Factor 
Approach 
(flights)
Shell-
dynamics 
(flights)
Transfer 
Factor 
Approach 
(flights)
Shell-
dynamics 
(flights)
0.075 0.1 0.2 5 10 2 4
0.020 0.2 1 10 27 4 10
*Intermediate Material Model at -423° F
NESC Spectrum-3 
(NESC Loading History)
NESC Spectrum-2 
(NESC Loading History)
NESC Spectrum-1 
(Boeing Loading History)
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7.5 Fatigue Life to Crack Initiation Analysis Methods and Results 
Crack Initiation Life Model 
A Monte Carlo simulation of the crack initiation behavior in the space shuttle fuel feedline, 
gimbal joint, flowliners has been devised.  It is assumed that fluid/structure interactions subject 
the liners to high cycle fatigue loading.  It is also assumed that each slot is equally likely to 
experience the maximum strain amplitude from the given vibration mode present in each flight 
regime (modes “clock” around). 
 
To predict the life of crack initiation fatigue damage is accumulated according to a linear damage 
rule (LDR), often referred to as Miner’s rule.  The LDR is based on assumption that there is no 
interaction between damage accumulated at various load levels and therefore no effect of loading 
history on subsequent damage accumulation.  The form of the LDR is shown in Eq. 7.5-1: 
 
 
m
m
N
n
N
n
N
nD L++=
2
2
1
1  Eq. (7.5-1) 
 
where nx is the number of cycles imposed at a given load level and Nx is the expected fatigue life 
at the given load level with the cycles counted and binned into arbitrary load levels.  When the 
accumulated damage, D, reaches 1.0, the crack is said to have initiated.  Crack initiation is 
typically defined as a detectable crack on the order of 0.02 to 0.03 inches.  Potentially more 
accurate damage interaction rules (such as the damage curve approach) require accurate 
knowledge of the loading history and data derived from sequential loading experiments, neither 
of which exists for this application and material. 
 
In order to use fatigue data, which is often performed under fully reversed (R = σmin/σmax = -1) 
uniaxial loading, to predict fatigue damage caused by an alternating load with a different mean 
stress, a correction to the alternating stress is typically applied.  Several mean stress correction 
approaches (Goodman, Soderberg, Morrow and Gerber) were examined in the process of 
developing the fatigue life tools used.  The Soderberg approach was selected because it seemed 
to fit the limited available data, and it provided the most conservative life predictions for high 
mean stress conditions. Equation 7.5-2 is the form for the Soderberg mean stress correction: 
 
 
⎥⎥⎦
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⎢⎢⎣
⎡
σ
σ−
σ=σ
y
mean
alt
So
1
 Eq. (7.5-2) 
 
The yield stress, σy, of IN178 at -423° F is 180 ksi. 
  
NASA Engineering And Safety Center  
Report 
Document #: 
RP-04-11/ 
04-004-E 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Orbiter LH2 Feedline Flowliner Cracking Problem 
Independent Technical Assessment (ITA) Report 
Page #: 
 87 of 132 
 
 
Results 
Deterministic and probabilistic calculations of the crack initiation life of the fuel feedline, gimbal 
joint, and flowliners were performed.  Referring to the results summarized in Table 7.5-1, 
deterministic calculations for circumferential crack locations, using the BTA/GTA derived 
loading spectra provided by Boeing (Section 7.2.1) at the time of this report, fewer than 10 
missions to crack initiation were predicted using mean fatigue properties.  Results are also 
presented in Table 7.5-1 for the two spectra generated by the NESC ITA Team. 
 
Table 7.5-1.  Results of Deterministic Crack Initiation Life Calculations for 
the Circumferential Crack Location 
 
Spectra Crack initiation 
life [missions] 
NESC Spectrum-1 (Boeing) upstream 4 
NESC Spectrum-2 (gage D47) upstream 10 
NESC Spectrum-3 (gage D95) upstream  41 
NESC Spectrum-1 (Boeing) downstream  8 
NESC Spectrum-2 (gage B132) downstream 2817 
NESC Spectrum-3 (gage B161) downstream 139 
 
 
A probabilistic crack initiation simulation of the upstream and downstream flowliners using the 
NESC Spectrum-1 applied over 25 missions resulted in many more cracks than observed in the 
shuttle fleet (an average of 87 simulated cracks per upstream liner and 49 simulated cracks per 
downstream liner, where the IN718 liners had an average of less than one crack per liner).   In 
order to approximate the distribution of cracks in the shuttle flowliners, the amplitudes of the 
stresses in the simulation must be significantly reduced.  By applying scaling factors of 0.25 and 
0.3 to the upstream and downstream Boeing spectra, the crack distributions shown in Figures 
7.5-1 and 7.5-2 for the upstream and downstream flowliners, respectively, are calculated.  This 
sizeable reduction in the overall loading spectra gives a more approximate level of cracking 
consistent with that observed in the fleet. 
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Figure 7.5-1.  Comparison of the number of cracks per upstream IN718 flowliner in 
the fleet and the scaled Boeing spectra simulation 
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Figure 7.5-2.  Comparison of the number of cracks per downstream IN718 flowliner 
in the fleet and the scaled Boeing spectra simulation 
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7.6 Edge Replication Examination Method 
Background 
Fracture mechanics based predictions have shown that flowliner high cycle fatigue cracking will 
propagate from extremely small surface cracks.   To ensure acceptable damage tolerant behavior, 
life predictions will likely require the detection of extremely small surface cracks.  Based on 
recent predictions, acceptable pre-existing crack size could be smaller than the crack detection 
threshold of traditional nondestructive examination methods (NDE).  As a result of these 
findings, a feasibility study is being conducted to evaluate a non-traditional NDE method, the 
surface replica method, for detecting small surface fatigue cracks contained in the Orbiter main 
engine flowliners.  The replica method is an established laboratory method that has been used by 
the fatigue and fracture community and for nearly three decades at NASA Langley Research 
Center for fatigue crack growth studies of micron sized surface cracks in aircraft structural 
alloys.  Reported herein are initial findings that discuss the replica method resolution for surface 
cracks contained in polished Inconel 718 slots similar to that contained in Orbiter flowliners. 
Procedure 
Fatigue tests were conducted using notched Inconel 718 specimens shown in Figure 7.6-1.  The 
notch reproduces the stress state of the flowliner slot under Mode I loading.  The specimens were 
fabricated at MSFC; the notch was formed using a punching process similar to flowliner slot 
fabrication followed by a polishing process that was developed by MSFC.  All fleet flowliners 
have been polished by the MSFC process.  During the fatigue tests, replica inspections were 
conducted to detect the onset of fatigue crack nucleation.  (Appendix D.5.2 provides a detailed 
description of the replication procedure).  Figure 7.6-1(b) shows an acetate tape positioned in the 
specimen slot while replicating the slot surface.  Acetate tape replicas were taken every 2000 to 
3000 load cycle intervals; at which point, the fatigue test was stopped, the specimen was 
unloaded, and the edge replicas were taken.  (To simulate replica inspection of the flowliner, 
zero-load was used to ensure the crack was fully closed as it would be during flowliner 
inspection). 
Results 
The series of SEM micrographs shown in Figure 7.6-2 demonstrates the resolution of the replica 
method for detecting small/short surface cracks contained in polished Inconel 718 slots.  Shown 
are acetate tape replicas taken from the same test specimen slot after (a) 215,000, (b) 235,000, (c) 
240,000, (d) 255,000, and (e) 270, 000 load cycles.  The replicas reveal the change in surface 
crack length of the single fatigue crack contained in a polished test specimen slot.  See Table 7.6-
1.  These data (micrographs) demonstrate acetate tape replica method resolution for small 
surface cracks at zero-load.  Additional work is currently being conducted to demonstrate the 
feasibility of using acetate tape and a new replica material (Repliset®) for inspecting flowliner 
slots for small surface cracks. 
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215,000 load cycles, (b) 240,000 load cycles, (c) 255,000 load cycles, and (d) 270,000 load 
cycles 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
Figure 7.6-2. Shown are acetate tape SEM micrographs of the same surface crack at: (a) 
(d) 
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Table 7.6-1.  Surface Crack Lengths (Replica Method) 
 
Micrograph  
(Figure No.) 
Fatigue Load Cycle 
(N) 
Surface Crack Length* 
Inch (m) 
7.6-2a 215,000 2a = 0.0008 (21) 
7.6-2b 240,000 2a = 0.0024 (60) 
7.6-2c 255,000 2a = 0.0072 (183) 
7.6-2d 270,000 C = 0.0110 (282) 
*Refer to Figure 7.6-2 for surface crack notation 
 
 
Discussion 
The micrographs shown in Figure 7.6-2 reveal that the polished notch exhibits a surface more 
conducive to the surface replica method compared to the as-punched surface shown in Appendix 
D.5.2.  The relatively smooth surface produced by the MSFC flowliner slot polishing method 
clearly exhibits shallow scratches that are normal to the fatigue crack plane and therefore does 
not interfere with fatigue surface crack detection.   Figure 7.6-2 (a) shows that the replica method 
has the resolution to detect a fatigue crack having a surface dimension (2a) of ≤0.001 inches and 
is able to accurately track crack propagation as it evolves into a corner crack of surface 
dimension (Figure 7.6-2 (c)) approximately 0.011 inch (Figure 7.6-2 (d)).  The replica base 
results for polished Inconel 718 slots shown in Table 7.6-1 demonstrate that the acetate tape 
method exhibits the resolution to detect fatigue cracks of surface dimension ≤0.001 inch. 
 
Conclusions 
1. The replica method exhibits the capability for detecting fatigue cracks of surface 
dimension ≤0.001 inches contained in polished notches having the same configuration as 
the Orbiter flowliner slots. 
 
2. The MSFC flowliner polishing produces a smooth surface containing shallow scratches 
that are normal to the fatigue crack plane and therefore does not interfere with fatigue 
surface crack detection by the replica method. 
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7.7 Nondestructive Evaluation Methods for In-service Inspection 
In the establishment of the Flowliner Independent Technical Assessment Plan, two NDE-related 
tasks were defined.  One was to assess the efficacy of nondestructive methods to measure the as-
assembled residual stress field in the test articles and the Orbiter flowliners.  The second task 
was to assess the efficacy of improved/refined nondestructive examination methods to reduce the 
inspection threshold for crack detection below the current threshold of 0.075 inch.  Although the 
residual stress task is important and work is progressing on that topic, it is not being covered in 
this report.  A more detailed version of this report is contained in Appendix D.5.1. 
 
The recommendations and observations in this report were derived in part from a review of the 
NDE effort at KSC on March 10, 2004.  A team of seven NDE experts with extensive 
backgrounds in NDE was selected from a pool of NDE experts who are members of the NESC’s 
NDE Super Problem Resolution Team (SPRT).  The team was interested in (1) assessing the 
current NDE techniques and capabilities on the flowliner and the weld repairs; (2) reviewing the 
plans for performing NDE on the BSTRA flowliners; and (3) estimating the potential increased 
inspection capabilities that could be realized with improvements in NDE to find smaller cracks.  
In addition, the NESC review included the added focus of trying to identify what else could be 
done to enhance flowliner safety.  
 
The ability to find smaller cracks than 0.075 in. has been demonstrated by industry many times 
over.  The 0.075 in. limit is a limit that is considered readily attainable by many technologies 
such as eddy current, ultrasound, and dye penetrant.  NASA document MSFC-STD-1249, 
“Standard NDE Guidelines and Requirements for Fracture Control Programs” (Sept. 11, 1985) 
(located in Appendix D.5.1) outlines the standard detection limits for which it is assumed that 
one can obtain a detection limit of 90/95 (90 percent probability of finding a flaw with 95 
percent confidence).  Based on that document, finding cracks of 0.075 in. would be considered 
standard and would not require the extra work of performing a POD study.  In the original effort 
by USA to find cracks in flowliners, this would be a standard limit for USA technicians and 
engineers to work towards given the program constraints. 
 
There are review studies that show the ability to attain lower detection limits.  These studies 
usually are built on standard samples with well manufactured real flaws.  A request of the DoD’s 
NTIAC’s office (Nondestructive Testing Information Analysis Center) produced two studies 
highlighting the accuracy of eddy current methods.  One study by Robert Lord of McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. (located in Appendix D.5.1) assessed the ability of dye penetrant and eddy current 
methods to find small cracks in F-15 spars (Material – Ti-6Al-4V).  The study shows the ability 
of both dye penetrant and eddy current methods to reliably detect cracks smaller than 0.020 in.  
Another report by Forsyth and Fahr of the Institute of Aerospace Research of the National 
Research Council of Canadian (located in Appendix D.5.1) shows the ability of automated eddy 
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current technique to detect cracks in the range of 0.020 in. in engine disks, while manual eddy 
current methods were less accurate.  
 
Based on these reports, the NESC NDE team reached the following conclusion (finding):   
 
Crack sizes smaller than 0.075 in. should be detectable and, with automation and care, one 
should approach the 0.020 in. limit.  The NESC NDE team also had several recommendations 
that are relevant to this report and which are highlighted in the NESC Review of Shuttle 
Flowliner Nondestructive Evaluation Report (attached in Appendix D.5.1).  Those 
recommendations dealt with (1) the execution of a proper POD study, with the fact that all the 
crack sizes found by USA were larger than 0.100 in. and none were found less than 0.100 in., 
and (2) a need to assess the surface condition of the slots after they had been polished.  
 
 
7.8 Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Structure of the Analysis 
This PRA is structured in the form of event sequence diagrams (ESD).  The diagrams follow the 
path of pivotal events necessary to go from an initiating event to the failure condition of interest.  
For this study, the failure event has been defined as SSME failure due to debris released into the 
fuel line.  Comparing the risk of this failure to SSME catastrophic risk is conservative, since 
debris release might not cause catastrophic failure.  Because of the small size and simple 
structure of the ESDs needed for this problem, they are modeled in Excel and quantified using a 
Monte Carlo simulation add-on package called Crystal Ball.  The ESDs have also been input into 
QRAS, and this tool could be used in later analyses. 
 
The ESDs are shown in Figures 7.8-1 and 7.8-2 for the circumferential and axial cracks, 
respectively.  Six initiating events are defined, with three for circumferential cracks and three for 
axial.  Axial cracks toward and away from the weld are combined because of a lack of detailed 
data that would differentiate them.  When more detailed analysis results become available, the 
axial directions can be separated into six events.  Similarly, the upstream and downstream liner 
data are combined.  Separating the liners would double the number of initiating events. 
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Figure 7.8-1.  Event Sequence Diagram For Circumferential Cracks 
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Figure 7.8-2.  Event Sequence Diagram For Axial Cracks 
Event Quantifications 
The following paragraphs provide information on how each initiating and pivotal event in the 
analysis is quantified.  Background information and data used are provided for each event.  
Assumptions and approximations made are stated.  Finally, the exact distribution used in the 
analysis is also provided.  To avoid repetition, similar events are organized together with 
common assumptions listed once.  Events that are identical are grouped together with one event 
definition. 
Crack Initiation Events (1.1, 2.1, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1, 6.2) 
These events all deal with the initiation of cracks in the flowliner.  Defining exactly when a crack 
“initiates” is somewhat problematic since incipient cracks can be assumed to be very small at the 
start of a flowliner’s life.  The PRA deals with this by using the historical crack rate data that has 
been observed to date.  Crack initiation is then looked upon as a rate of occurrence or “birth 
process” that is somewhat independent of an exact threshold for crack size.  Structural analyses 
of crack initiation have not yet given results that are suitable for use in the PRA.  A screening 
efficiency of 50 percent for the current inspection technique is assumed.  (The current analysis 
relies on the earlier POD studies that qualified inspection procedures with a 0.075 inch 90/95 
detection limit).   The NDE escape event sequence deals with the possibility of missing a crack 
from the 50 percent that would ideally be screened.  Additionally, no credit has been given for 
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the slot polishing conducted in 2002.  For the case of off-nominal engine operation, it is assumed 
that increased exposure of the flowliner to flow-induced excitation will occur.  The screening 
efficiency factor is removed for the crack initiation events on these paths to account for the 
possible growth of smaller cracks to failure. 
Table 7.8-1.   Flowliner Crack History in the Current Fleet 
 
Orbiter 
Vehicle 
Flights Circumferential 
Cracks 
Axial 
Cracks 
Total 
Cracks 
103 30 0 3 3 
104 26 2 1 3 
105 19 0 2 2 
Total 75 2 6 8 
 
All crack initiation events are quantified based on the historical observation of cracks in the 
current fleet of Orbiters with Inconel 718 liners.  Table 7.8-1 summarizes the flowliner crack 
history.  Bayesian updating of a non-informative prior is used to find the 50 percent and 95 
percent confidence bounds for circumferential and axial crack occurrence per flight.  The event 
quantifications use a Lognormal fit to these two percentiles to facilitate application of the 
screening factor where it is used.  The Lognormal has a similar shape to the Beta for these cases, 
so this approximation is minor.  The uncertainty from the Bayesian updating process results in 
error factors of 2.3 for the circumferential crack events and 1.7 for the axial.  The error factor is 
defined as the ratio of the 95th percentile over the 50th percentile.  The crack initiation event 
quantifications are shown in Table 7.8-2. 
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Table 7.8-2.   Crack Initiation Event Quantifications 
 
Event 
Number 
Event Name 50 Percent 95 Percent 
1.1 Circumferential Crack Close to DL 0.0175 0.0403 
2.1 Circumferential Crack Greater Than DL 0.0175 0.0403 
3.2 Circumferential Crack Not So Close to DL 0.0350 0.0805 
4.1 Axial Crack Close to DL 0.0437 0.0749 
5.1 Axial Crack Greater Than DL 0.0437 0.0749 
6.2 Axial Crack Not So Close to DL 0.0874 0.1499 
Off-Nominal Engine Operation Events (3.1, 6.1) 
A variety of off-nominal conditions have been raised as possible risks for exposure of the 
flowliners to extended excitation.  Some preliminary risk estimates have been made for these 
conditions, all ranging below the estimated SSME shutdown risk of 1 in 255.  For the current 
analysis, the assumption has been made that the 95 percent uncertainty bound is approximately 
equal to the SSME shutdown risk, rounded to 1 in 250 (0.004).  In order to maintain a relatively 
high median risk, an error factor of 2 is assumed.  Because they are quantifying the same event, 
the two off-nominal events are tied together in the ESD quantification so they always have the 
same value.  Events 3.1 and 6.1 have the same value drawn from a Lognormal uncertainty with 
50 percent = 0.02 and 95 percent = 0.04. 
Flowliner Excitation Events (1.2, 2.3, 3.3, 4.2, 5.3, 6.3) 
These events are included in the ESD to account for the variable nature of flowliner excitation.  
Because the crack initiation events are based on the total flight history, these events are all 
currently set to 1.0.  If any changes are made to reduce the likelihood of flowliner excitation, the 
improvement will be reflected in these events.  Additionally, if the fatigue life analysis uses a 
loading spectrum that has a specific likelihood, that likelihood can be reflected in these events.  
Events 1.2, 2.3, 3.3, 4.2, 5.3, 6.3 are all set to a value of 1.0. 
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NDE Escape Events (2.2, 5.2) 
A POD study has not been conducted for the current inspection method.  Qualitative statements 
that the inspection is capable of finding flaws below the detection limit support it being fairly 
reliable.  A B-basis capability is assumed for this analysis, which is a 95 percent confidence that 
90 percent of flaws at the detection limit are detected.  An error factor of three is assumed for the 
uncertainty.  This yields escape probabilities of 0.0333 at 50 percent and 0.10 at 95 percent.  The 
two percentiles are fit to a Lognormal uncertainty distribution.  The full 50 percent of cracks that 
are considered screened out from event 1.1 are assumed to be above the detection limit for this 
branch of the ESD.  This is a conservative assumption that is made due to the lack of information 
on the distribution of crack sizes.  The likelihood of cracks larger than the detection limit can be 
examined in an updated analysis.  Because the axial and circumferential cracks have no 
fundamental difference, events 2.2 and 5.2 are tied together in the ESD quantification so they 
always have the same value.  Events 2.2 and 5.2 have the same value drawn from a Lognormal 
uncertainty with 50 percent = 0.0333 and 95 percent = 0.10. 
Fatigue Life Crack Growth Events (1.4, 2.4, 3.4, 4.4, 5.4, 6.4) 
All initiated cracks are assumed to be “close” to the detection limit and therefore have the same 
fatigue life as a crack at the detection limit.  For this current analysis, results of the “Forward 
Fracture Analysis” (FFA) that was conducted by the program prior to the ITA study are used.  
This should be updated as new fracture mechanics analysis results become available.  The 
fracture life analyses define failure as a large crack, which has had several definitions.  No 
specific size is explicitly assumed in the PRA analysis.  The FFA found a minimum fracture life 
of 0.8 flights for one circumferential crack location.  This analysis assumes that all 
circumferential locations have the same life.  The FFA is by intention a conservative bound on 
fracture life and contains multiple conservative assumptions, including material properties, 
loading spectrum, and residual stress.  To account for these conservatisms, this analysis assumes 
that the FFA results correspond to an A-Basis tolerance bound, which is a 95 percent confidence 
limit on the 1st percentile of a population.  The 0.8 life is converted to a failure rate and expanded 
to one flight assuming an Exponential distribution.  This yields a 95th percentile failure rate of 1 
in 80 (0.0125).  An error factor of three is assumed for the uncertainty and yields a 50th 
percentile of 1 in 240 (0.0042).  Assuming a higher uncertainty would reduce the median failure 
rate.  The 50th and 95th percentiles are used to define a Lognormal uncertainty distribution for the 
crack growth event.  For the axial crack case, the same procedure is performed assuming a 
fracture life of two flights.  This assumption should be updated in later analyses if new 
information becomes available. 
 
No fracture life analysis is available for either the inspection escape or off-nominal performance 
ESD branches.  An inspection escape crack should not be considerably larger than the detection 
limit, but could have significantly shorter life.  The off-nominal performance case could cause 
extended excitation of the flowliner.  For both of these cases, an increase by a factor of five is 
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assumed.  The inspection escape case has a factor of five increase on failure rate, and the off-
nominal case has a factor of five increase on duration.  These assumptions should be updated in 
later analyses if new information becomes available.  All fatigue life crack growth event 
quantifications are shown in Table 7.8-3. 
Table 7.8-3.  Crack Fatigue Life Events 
Event 
Number 
Event Name 50 Percent 95 Percent 
1.4 Grow to Large Circumferential Crack 0.0042 0.0125 
2.4 Grow to Large Circumferential Crack Given 
Larger Size 
0.0203 0.0609 
3.4 Grow to Large Circumferential Crack Given 
Larger Exposure 
0.0203 0.0609 
4.4 Grow to Large Axial Crack 0.0017 0.0050 
5.4 Grow to Large Axial Crack Given Larger Size 0.0083 0.0248 
6.4 Grow to Large Axial Crack Given Larger 
Exposure 
0.0083 0.0248 
 
Crack Propagation Events (1.5, 4.5) 
For the case of circumferential cracks, this is growth across the ligament, leaving a “tab” that is 
secured at one end.  For axial cracks, the growth would be to the flowliner attachment weld or to 
the free edge.  The eight cracks observed in the Inconel liners were all fairly small.  The two 
circumferential cracks were both roughly 0.3 inches and the six axial cracks ranges from 0.1 to 
0.23 inches.  This would indicate that either all the cracks are very new, or that they either grow 
slowly or tend to arrest.  (Analysis and testing is underway that will answer the question of 
whether the cracks arrest).  In order to quantify the circumferential crack growth event for Phase 
I, the total fleet history of five cracks is used.  This adds three circumferential cracks from the 
102 CRES liners, which had a smaller ligament distance between the slots.  One of these three 
cracks grew across the ligament.  Bayesian updating of a non-informative prior yields a Beta 
distribution with parameters (2,5).  For the axial cracks, six cracks have been observed with zero 
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growing to a large size.  Bayesian updating is also used for this event, yielding a Beta(1,7) 
uncertainty.  Event 1.5 has a Beta(2,5) uncertainty and event 4.5 has Beta(1,7).  
Failure Propagation Events (1.6, 4.6) 
The two failure propagation events are different but have a similar lack of data.  Some 
preliminary analyses have been done for both, but results have not been verified. The analysis 
can be updated if better information becomes available.  For the circumferential crack across the 
ligament, preliminary analysis has been done to show that the tab would have a much higher 
natural frequency than the driving loads.  There is also the one case where the crack grew across 
and the ligament was not lost.  It is not known how many flights the one observed tab endured.  
For the axial cracks, analysis has indicated that the cracks should arrest due to leaving the areas 
of highest residual stress and loading.  It is also not clear how rapidly a large axial crack in either 
direction could propagate to failure.  Growth of a crack all the way to the weld or to the free edge 
would not necessarily cause a rapid failure.  Both of these events have been called unlikely by 
the experts.  For the current analysis, this has been conservatively assumed to be a mean value of 
1 in 10.  The analysts also appear fairly confident that there is not a very high risk, so a 
Beta(5,45) is assumed.  This Beta has a 50 percent of 0.095 and 95 percent of 0.177.  Since the 
two events are different, they are not tied together in the simulation.  Events 1.6 and 4.6 each 
have a Beta(5,45) uncertainty. 
Results 
The results of the current analysis show that that flowliner cracking is not predicted to be a 
significant contributor to SSME risk.  While the uncertainty of the risk estimate is rather large, 
the upper bounds on that uncertainty are in the range of 2.0E-5, or 1 in 50,000.  Figure 7.8-3 
shows the distribution of resulting SSME Failure risk estimates for a 40,000 trial simulation. 
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Figure 7.8-3.  Distribution of SSME failure risk 
 
Summary  
Results from the PRA show the risk of SSME damage due to cracks in the flowliner is an 
insignificant contributor to the overall SSME catastrophic risk, assuming inspection after every 
flight.  While the PRA results currently have a very wide uncertainty band, large changes in 
multiple inputs would be required to increase the risk to a level where it is a significant 
contributor to the overall SSME catastrophic risk.  The median (50 percent) and 95 percent upper 
bound of the risk estimate are expected to be reduced by results from on-going tests and analyses 
and the elimination of overly conservative assumptions made in earlier analyses.  The PRA 
models the risk from flowliner cracks in a logic model called an event sequence diagram (ESD).  
The ESD contains six initiating events and 20 pivotal events linked in sequences that lead to 
failure.  Uncertainty distributions are defined for the risk of occurrence for each of the 26 events.  
Monte Carlo simulation is used to propagate the risk uncertainties through the ESD into a total 
risk estimate. 
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8.0 ROOT CAUSES, OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS, PROPOSED 
FLIGHT RATIONALE 
In this chapter, the findings from the Root Causes investigation are presented along with the 
supporting facts.  Next, the significant conclusions reached from the technical assessment 
described in Chapter 7 are stated in the form of Observations and Findings.  Using the results of 
the root causes investigation and findings as a foundation, a strategy to achieve a Flight 
Rationale is proposed.  Recommendations for developing the flight rationale are detailed in 
Section 9.0. 
 
8.1 Root Causes Investigation 
There are four potential mechanisms at low temperatures for initiating cracks.  These 
mechanisms include low cycle fatigue, high cycle fatigue, overloads, and stress corrosion 
cracking.  There is strong evidence suggesting that high cycle fatigue is the mechanism that 
initiated the cracks.  However, for one axial crack location, low cycle fatigue could also be a 
contributing cause.  There is no evidence to suggest that the cracks found in the fleet were 
produced by an overload or stress corrosion cracking.  Low cycle fatigue and high cycle fatigue 
are discussed in more detail below. 
 
The high cycle fatigue regime is characterized by elastic material response for which crack 
initiation is highly sensitive to discontinuities such as manufacturing defects.  The scatter in 
fatigue life is quite large in this regime and variations of an order of magnitude in life above and 
below the median life is an accepted norm.  To appreciate how this applies to the flowliner, 
consider the fatigue and statistical data plotted in Figure 8.1-1.  These data were compiled for an 
aluminium alloy subjected to constant amplitude cyclic loadings in a rotating bend specimen [ref. 
S. Webber and J.C. Levy, 1958].  Notice that for low cycle fatigue at an alternating stress of 
50,000 lbs/in2, the mean life is about 5x104 cycles and the data scatter in life is about a factor of 
two.  Then, for high cycle fatigue at the alternating stress of 35,000 lbs/in2, the mean life is about 
1.5x107 cycles but the data scatter in life is about two orders of magnitude.  This is typical of 
high cycle fatigue behavior exhibited by all structural metals.  On close examination of failed 
laboratory specimens, the cracks that form in specimens exhibiting short/early fatigue lives 
typically initiate at some local stress concentration feature such as a scratch, gouge, or surface 
pit.  In contrast, specimens exhibiting longer lives typically experience cracks initiating at 
microstructural defects in the materials such as inclusion particles.  Extending this behavior to a 
typical structure, such as the flowliner, subjected to high cycle fatigue, a single “dominant crack” 
typically controls the fatigue life.  This is especially the case when high cycle fatigue is 
exacerbated by contributing factors such as global stress concentrations due to geometry, local 
stress concentrations due to surface roughness and/or metallurgical features, and tensile mean 
stress.  This “dominant crack” scenario is consistent with the cracking behavior observed in the 
fleet where only 11 cracks nucleated and grew to a detectable size in the 24 flowliners (2 
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flowliners at the gimbal joint of each LH2 feedline), each with numerous potential crack 
initiation sites. 
 
Intermediate cycle fatigue implies predominately elastic behavior, but with small amounts of 
plasticity.  Likewise, low cycle fatigue typically exhibits considerable plasticity.  Whether 
intermediate or low cycle fatigue, this plasticity can cause the stress concentration influence of 
manufacturing defects to be relieved or diminished.  This reduces the number of preferred sites 
where a crack might initiate. As the cyclic stress increases, the degree of local plasticity 
increases.  This promotes the initiation of numerous cracks initiating at about the same life, and 
results in both the mean life and data scatter decreasing.  In fact, if the cyclic stresses are too 
high, there could be multiple low cycle fatigue cracks emanating from the same general site 
(crack-tip branching).  This is not the behavior exhibited by the flowliner cracks in the fleet. 
 
Two distinctly different (root causes) scenarios are required to describe the crack behavior 
exhibited by the flowliners.   Root cause Finding 1 addresses the behavior of all circumferential 
cracks initiating along the straight sides of the drainage slots and extending across the ligament 
between slots and the axial cracks initiating at the radius of drainage slots and extending toward 
the free end of the flowliner.  Root cause Finding 2 addresses the behavior of the axial crack 
initiating at the radius of the drainage slot and extending toward the assembly weld attaching the 
flowliner to the gimbal joint flange.  These two root cause findings are fully documented in the 
following sections.    
 
Reference 
 
Webber, S. and Levy, J.C.: Cumulative Damage in Fatigue with Reference to the Scatter of 
Results, S&T Memo. No. 15/58, Technical Information and Library Services, Ministry of 
Supply, August 1958. (Work carried out at the Northampton College of Advanced Technology, 
London, U.K., Contract No. 7/GEN/1748/PR3). 
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Figure 8.1-1. Statistical distribution of high cycle fatigue data (rotating bending) for 
wrought D.T.D 683 high-strength aluminium alloy 
(ref.: Webber and Levy, 1958) 
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8.1.1 All Circumferential Cracks and Axial Cracks at the Slot End Opposite the 
Assembly Weld   
 
Root Cause Finding 1:  The most likely cause of the circumferential cracks initiating along the 
sides of the drainage slot and extending across the ligament between slots and the axial cracks 
initiating at the radius of the drainage slot and extending toward the free end of the flowliner 
(end opposite the assembly weld) observed in the fleet is high cycle fatigue assisted by 
geometric and local (surface roughness) stress concentrations.   
 
Supporting Facts: 
 
1. Only 11 cracks were found in the fleet.  (If this were low cycle fatigue, one would expect 
many more cracks with approximately 6,000 potential crack initiation sites). 
 
2. All Orbiters saw between 19 and 30 flights (2 cracks in OV-105 in 19 flights; 3 cracks in 
OV-104 in 26 flights; 3 cracks in OV-102 in 28 flights; and 3 cracks in OV-103 in 30 
flights).  
 
3. In the CRES 321 flowliners in OV-102, one circumferential crack grew completely 
across the 0.25-inch ligament.  In the Inconel 718 flowliners in the other Orbiters, no 
circumferential cracks grew completely across the 0.75 inch ligament.  In addition, most 
cracks in the Inconel 718 were essentially the same length. 
 
4. There are four potential mechanisms at low temperatures for initiating cracks.  All but 
high cycle fatigue can be ruled out.  (There is no evidence of stress corrosion cracking, 
cracks from overloads, or low cycle fatigue for these crack locations). 
 
5. High frequency (greater than 1,000 Hz) flow induced cyclic loading sources are known to 
exist. 
 
6. The natural frequencies (greater than 1,000 Hz) of the flowliner fall within the range of 
the known excitation sources. 
 
7. The slot punching process results in rough surfaces with scratch-like and gouge-like 
defects.  Pit-like defects were found in the MPTA CRES 321 flowliner but not in the 
recently fabricated Inconel 718 flowliner test article.  (Photographs taken on the Orbiter 
slots in 2002 also show scratches and gouge-like defects). 
 
8. High cycle fatigue data of metallic materials exhibits significant data scatter (an order of 
magnitude or greater under controlled laboratory conditions). 
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9. The slot geometry has high stress concentration factors in excess of 4.0 in some locations 
(Section 7.3).   
 
For a simple tensile load, the stress concentration at the slot is only about 1.6.  However, 
the stress concentration factor is considerably higher for the high frequency modes 
considered to be excited by the flow-induced loading mechanisms.  For the nine-node 
(9ND) mode shape of the upstream flowliner, the stress concentration factors (transfer 
ratios) are 3.5 and 2.7 for the circumferential crack location and the axial crack at the free 
end away from the weld, respectively.  In the downstream liner for the C4ND mode, the 
stress concentration factors (transfer ratios) are 3.3 and 4.0 for the circumferential crack 
location and the axial crack at the free end away from the weld, respectively. 
 
10. The cracks found in OV-104 exhibit the following characteristics of fatigue:  features 
similar to striation marks, to tear ridges indicative of cyclic loading, and no evidence of 
plasticity (Appendix C.2).   
 
Edge replicas were taken of the circumferential crack between slots 42-43 in OV-104 and 
the axial crack at slot 9 extending toward the free end of the flowliner in OV-104 [Ref.: 
viewgraphs provided by Raymond Patin].  The two crack faces were slightly displaced, 
so only a small part of the crack surface was captured on the replica.   A metallurgical 
failure analysis of the replicas was conducted by NASA JSC to determine the likely cause 
of the cracks.  The circumferential crack was described as exhibiting a fracture surface 
indicative of fatigue. Tear ridges perpendicular to the crack edge indicate a simple or 
reversed bending loading mechanism.  Some crack branching, well into the crack 
propagation stage, was also observed.  The axial crack was also described as exhibiting a 
fracture surface indicative of fatigue.  Tear ridges parallel to the crack edge indicate a 
tensile loading mechanism.  No crack branching was observed.  Both cracks exhibited 
markings that resembled striation marks. 
 
11. The crack found in the MPTA E1 flowliner exhibits the following characteristics of 
fatigue:  crack initiated at a surface defect on the OD corner of the slot, smooth crescent-
shaped fracture footprint, 16 beachmarks, and striation-like banding, and no evidence of 
plasticity (Appendix C.3).   
 
Based on an examination by the edge replication method of the slots in the MPTA CRES 
321 flowliners, no additional fatigue cracks greater than 0.030 inches were found.  One 
fatigue crack greater than 0.030 inches was previously found in 2002.  This was a 
circumferential crack initiating from a gouge-like defect at the OD corner of the slot.  A 
metallurgical failure analysis was conducted by Boeing to determine the likely cause of 
this crack [Reference:  Boeing Lab Report No. M&PE-2-1327, January 3, 2003]. The 
results of the analysis are summarized as follows: “Fracture traces indicated that cracking 
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initiated from a grinding mark on the “backside” (i.e., OD side) of the flowliner near the 
edge of the punched inspection/drain hole.  Failure initiated at the flowliner OD and 
traveled across the part thickness, suggesting fatigue might have been influenced by 
bending loads.  The base material had no visible necking (ductile deformation) adjacent 
to the fracture and exhibited the relatively smooth, crescent-shaped fracture “footprint” 
typical of classical fatigue.  Approximately 16 beachmarks (typically associated with 
random, varying, or intermittent loads) were observed representing successive positions 
of the advancing crack front.  High magnification (4000x to 8000x) analysis found 
fracture features which displayed striation-like banding, however, no extended or clearly 
defined striations were found.” 
 
12. The flowliners in the orbiter fleet do not exhibit the characteristics of widespread fatigue 
damage (Appendix C.1).   
 
Each flowliner has numerous slot locations of approximately the same peak alternating 
stress.  For example, the nine-node (9ND) mode shape has nine hot spots where the peak 
stresses are similar.  In addition, there are several locations around each slot where high 
stress concentrations exist.  Therefore, numerous cracks of various lengths would be 
expected if the structure experienced low cycle fatigue.  This behavior is often referred to 
as widespread fatigue damage or multi-site fatigue damage.  An example of widespread 
fatigue damage is the failure of the CRES 321 flowliners in the LOX feedlines during the 
qualification tests conducted in 1977-78 [Federal-Mogul Arrowhead Products, report 
MPS-QTR-13542-302, B, G-2, August 20, 1981].  Fourteen ligaments between the slots 
in the downstream flowliners and 8 ligaments in the upstream flowliner were cracked.  A 
metallurgical failure analysis was conducted by Rockwell [Rockwell International, 
Internal Letter, 282-204-081-185, August 24, 1981]. The results were summarized as 
follows: “A scanning electron microscope examination revealed that cracking had 
propagated by fatigue with final failure due to overload.  No evidence suggestive of the 
fracture initiation site could be found.  No material or processing defects were apparent.  
It appears that failure was the result of the overtest environment to which the flowliner 
had been exposed”.  This fatigue behavior is in stark contrast to the cracking behavior 
exhibited by the MPTA flowliner and the flowliners in the orbiter fleet.   
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8.1.2 Axial Crack at the Slot End Nearest the Assembly Weld  
 
Root Cause Finding 2:  The most likely cause of the axial crack initiating at the radius of the 
drainage slot and extending toward the assembly weld is a combination of low cycle and high 
cycle fatigue assisted by geometric and local (surface roughness) stress concentrations.   
 
Supporting Facts: 
 
1. High fidelity examination by the edge replication method of the MPTA CRES 321 
flowliner revealed the existence of numerous micro-cracks initiating from pit-like surface 
flaws (0.001 to 0.005 inches) in the axial location of the slot near the weld side.  These 
micro-cracks exhibited high plastic strain (blunting and crack branching).  This suggests 
low cycle fatigue as a possible mechanism for axial cracks growing toward the weld.  The 
most likely low cycle loading condition is the thermal shock resulting from the numerous 
LH2 feedline fill.  (Refer to Appendix D.5.2).   
 
2. The slot punching process results in rough surfaces with scratch-like and gouge-like 
defects.  Pit-like defects were found in the MPTA CRES 321 flowliner but not in the 
recently fabricated Inconel 718 flowliner test article.  (Photographs taken on the Orbiter 
slots in 2002 also show scratches and gouge-like defects). 
 
3. Only one axial crack at the weld end of the slot in the upstream flowliner was found in 
the fleet (OV-103 with 30 flights).  There were no axial cracks at this location found in 
the other Orbiters (OV-105 with 19 flights; OV-104 with 26 flights; and OV-102 with 28 
flights). 
 
4. High frequency (greater than 1,000 Hz) flow induced cyclic loading sources are known to 
exist. 
 
5. The natural frequencies (greater than 1,000 Hz) of the flowliner fall within the range of 
the known excitation sources. 
 
6. This location is nearest the assembly weld and has a high level of residual stresses 
(Appendix D.3.3).  In addition, this location also has high stresses from the thermal shock 
due to the LH2 fill.  The combination of the weld residual stresses and the thermal shock 
results in a local stress at the slot in excess of yield in CRES 321.  Likewise, the stress 
approaches yield in Inconel 718 and would exceed yield at any local stress concentration 
such as a defect produced by the punching process.   Therefore, local yielding could 
occur on the first LH2 fill and would likely “shake down” to nominally elastic behavior 
thereafter.  This is consistent with the characteristics of the micro-cracks found in the 
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MPTA flowliners (small cracks exhibiting evidence of plastic deformation but with little 
crack propagation). 
 
7. At the point of the slot nearest the assembly weld location, for the nine-node (9ND) 
mode, the stress concentration factor (transfer ratio) is about 1.6 for the upstream liner 
and about 2.2 for the downstream liner.  
 
8. Supporting Facts 1 and 2 may be unique to OV-102, the only Orbiter with the CRES 321 
flowliners, because Inconel 718 has a significantly higher yield stress than CRES 321.  
However, all the other facts are directly applicable to the Inconel 718 flowliners.    
 
8.1.3 Conclusions from Root Causes Investigation 
Several important conclusions are drawn from the root causes investigation.  The initiation and 
growth of only a few cracks in the orbiter fleet can be attributed to the combined influence of 
geometric stress concentrations due to the drainage slots, local stress concentrations due to 
surface roughness produced by the manufacturing process, residual stresses from the flowliner 
forming process and welding to the feedline flange, low cycle fatigue due to thermal stresses 
from the LH2 fill, and high cycle fatigue due to flow-induced loads.  Of these contributing 
factors, only the local stress concentration due to surface roughness can be corrected in the fleet 
without redesigning the flowliners.  The original slot punching process was crude and resulted in 
a high degree of surface imperfections.  Removing these defects as potential crack initiation sites 
will significantly increase the fatigue life to crack initiation.  If all pre-existing fatigue cracks are 
repaired, removing the surface defects by polishing effectively (for all practical purposes) 
eliminates the original source of the cracking problem.  Returning the orbiters to flight, therefore, 
depends on monitoring (by in-service inspections) future crack initiation and growth to ensure 
that all fatigue cracks are found and repaired before they grow to the critical crack size.  In fact, 
the slots were polished in 2002 to improve the slot surface quality and a procedure to inspect the 
flowliners after every flight was implemented.  
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8.2 Observations and Findings 
 
8.2.1 General Findings 
 
F-1. The past flight history and the root causes investigation leads to the conclusion that the 
actions taken in 2002 to repair the LH2 gimbal joint flowliners render the Orbiter safe to 
flya.  This is provided the flowliners are inspectedb before return-to-flight to ensure that 
all surface flaws were removedc by polishing and all fatigue cracks are repaired.  The 
flowliners must also be inspected after every flight and all fatigue cracks repaired.   
 
Notes: 
a. This does not address off nominal conditions. 
b. Inspections will require a high fidelity verification of slot surface quality and the 
absence of fatigue cracks. 
c. If the original polishing was not effective, then additional polishing will be required. 
 
F-2. Results from the PRA performed in Phase I show the risk of SSME damage due to cracks 
in the flowliner is an insignificant contributor to the overall SSME catastrophic risk, 
assuming inspection after every flight (Section 7.8). 
 
8.2.2 Specific Technical Observations and  Findings 
  
Methods for determining residual fatigue life, critical crack sizes, and crack detection 
(inspection). 
 
Observations:  
 
O-1. Since the fatigue crack growth rate varies exponentially with the alternating stress 
intensity factor, da/dN = c(dK)n, predictions of residual fatigue life are highly sensitive to 
small changes in the peak stresses in the loading spectrum.  Therefore, the fatigue life 
predictions are highly sensitive to the engineering approximations used in developing the 
load spectrum (Section 7.3). 
O-2. The mean stress effect is primarily a crack closure effect.  Because crack closure is highly 
dependent on crack-tip plasticity, crack closure effects can only be predicted on a cycle-
by-cycle basis which requires precise knowledge of the loading sequence in the 
spectrum.  The knowledge of the flowliner loading spectrum required to predict crack 
closure cannot be specified.   Changing the R-ratio from one loading block to another in 
the spectrum without accounting for crack closure is inaccurate and non-conservative.  
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Therefore, it is more conservative to base the crack growth predictions on the data for R= 
0.9, where no closure effects are present in the crack growth rates (Section 7.3). 
O-3. Based on the fracture morphology exhibited by the crack in the MPTA flowliner, fatigue 
cracks appear to initiate as a corner crack and grow in a self-similar manner before 
transitioning to a through-crack.  Therefore, it is both reasonable and conservative to 
assume that the crack initiates as a quarter-circular crack, grows with an aspect ratio of 
a/c=1, then transitions to a through-crack when a=c=0.050" (Section 7.3).  
O-4. Structural metals have been shown to exhibit an increase in the fatigue crack growth 
threshold with decreasing temperature [Ref.: P.K. Liaw and W.A. Logsdon, Engineering 
Fracture Mechanics, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 585-594].  This behavior is directly related to 
temperature-dependent microstructural effects that can be explained from a materials 
science viewpoint.  This is the trend exhibited by Inconel 718.  Therefore, it is 
appropriate to use the crack growth rate data recently obtained at -423o F even though the 
NASGRO data at -320o F is more conservative (Section 7.3). 
O-5. The stress intensity factor is a function of crack length and applied load.  Also, the crack 
growth rate is an exponential function of the alternating stress intensity factor.  Therefore, 
decreasing the crack detection size below the current value of 0.075 in. will exponentially 
increase the residual life.  However, the fracture mechanics results show the effect to be 
small for more severe loading spectra (Section 7.3). 
O-6. The finite element modal analysis of the dominant frequencies being excited during the 
BTA test confirms the existence of both membrane and bending components of strain at 
the crack initiation sites.  Therefore, transfer ratios for the membrane component and 
bending component have been developed and the fracture mechanics analysis has been 
modified accordingly.  The predicted values of residual fatigue life are significantly 
affected by the membrane component.  The results show that the approximation of 
assuming only a bending component of strain is highly non-conservative and is not 
supported by the structural dynamics analysis (Section 7.3). 
O-7. Because the fatigue loading spectrum is predominantly due to flow-induced vibration, the 
fracture mechanics analysis must be directly integrated with the structural dynamics 
analysis.  The structural dynamics analysis uses a transfer ratio approximation to relate 
the mid-ligament strains measured in the BTA test to the crack initiation sites at the edge 
of the slots.  All fracture mechanics sensitivity studies were conducted for the transfer 
ratio method (Section 7.3).  As a further refinement of the fracture mechanics 
methodology, a fully three-dimensional finite element analysis method was developed 
that rigorously combines the fracture mechanics and the structural dynamics. This 
approach does not require the use of transfer ratios (Section 7.4).  Comparing the results 
from the two methods, it is obvious that the transfer ratio approximation method is overly 
conservative. 
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Findings: 
 
F-3. For the Boeing load history derived from the BTA/GTA test data and the NESC-derived 
loading spectra, the critical circumferential crack size is 0.020 inch for a residual fatigue 
life greater than four flights for the upstream liner and greater than one flight for the 
downstream liner.  (Section 7.4). 
 
F-4. The prediction of the residual fatigue life using fracture mechanics must include both the 
membrane and bending components for both the upstream and downstream flowliners 
(Section 7.3).   
 
F-5. The conservative fracture mechanics crack growth predictions, based on the Boeing 
spectrum, are not consistent with the observed fleet cracking behavior (many more cracks 
and all circumferential cracks completely across the ligament) (Section 7.3). 
 
F-6. The fatigue life to crack initiation predictions, based on the Boeing fatigue spectrum, 
result in many more cracks than are observed in the fleet.  Using a conservative 
correction for the mean stress, the fatigue life is 4 missions for the upstream flowliner and 
8 missions for the downstream flowliner.  (To match the cracking pattern observed in the 
fleet in a crack initiation simulation requires the Boeing spectra to be scaled by a factor of 
less than one half) (Section 7.5). 
 
F-7. Analytical results show that LPB is a surface enhancement treatment that can extend 
flowliner high cycle fatigue life (Appendix D.6). 
 
F-8. Based on an examination by the edge replication method of the slots in the MPTA CRES 
321 flowliners, no additional fatigue cracks greater than 0.030 inches were found. (One 
fatigue crack greater than 0.030 inches was previously found in 2002.  This was a 
circumferential crack initiating from a gouge-like defect at the OD corner of the slot), 
(Appendix D.5.2).  
 
F-9. In addition, the high fidelity examination by the edge replication method of the slots in 
the MPTA CRES 321 flowliners revealed the existence of numerous micro-cracks 
ranging from 0.001 to 0.005 inches.  The micro-cracks were oriented in the axial 
direction facing the assembly weld and initiated from pit-like surface flaws.  These 
micro-cracks exhibited evidence of plastic strain in the form of crack-tip blunting and 
crack branching.  (The pit-like surface flaws were not found in the recently fabricated 
Inconel 718 flowliner test article) (Appendix D.5.2). 
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F-10. Previous POD studies of edge cracks have established 0.020 inches as the detection limit 
(90-95 percent confidence level) for conventional, automated eddy current and dye 
penetrant methods (Section 7.7).  
 
F-11. Based on laboratory examinations of fatigue test coupons, the edge replication methods 
(acetate tape and RepliSet®) detected surface fatigue cracks as small as 0.001 inches 
under zero load.  (Further work is required to establish POD data and the final inspection 
limit) (Section 7.6). 
 
Flight Environment and Loading Spectra 
 
Observations: 
 
O-9. The acoustic environment of the bellows cavity is extremely complex.  Fluid flow over 
geometric edges such as the trailing or leading edges of the flowliner slots can create 
“edge tones” if the fluid conditions couple to the local geometry.   One possibility is the 
cavity formed by the bellows and flowliner(s) is an acoustic resonance.  While acoustic 
resonance can be excited by “edge tones” many other physical conditions can also excite 
cavity resonance.  General flow turbulence, pumping of flow through the slots from the 
duct, and excitation due to cavitation can all lead to resonance.  Air flow tests can provide 
insight into the flow character around the slot and the acoustic character of the bellows 
cavity (Section 7.1).   
 
O-10. CFD results confirmed that there is a backflow caused by the LPFP inducer.  The reverse 
flow near the inducer blade tip is caused by the pressure difference between the pressure 
side (facing downstream into the pump) and suction side (facing upstream) of the inducer 
blade.  The region of reverse flow extends far enough upstream to interfere with both the 
downstream and upstream flowliners at the gimbal joint.  It also causes swirl to occur in 
the flow approaching the inducer.  Thus the local flow will cross the flowliner slots at an 
oblique angle instead of along the axis of the feedline.  Based on the computed CFD 
results, the swirl velocity in the cavity is about 10 percent of the inducer tip velocity.  
Reverse flow in the duct also interacts with the flow in the bellows cavity through the gap 
formed by the overlap between the upstream and downstream flowliners.  A strong jet 
flow, with velocities of about 15 percent of the inducer tip speed, penetrates directly into 
the bellows cavity resulting in strong unsteady recirculation regions in the cavity (Section 
7.1).   
 
O-11. A comparison of the CFD results from both the Program Team and the ITA Team, with 
test data from the pressure measurements obtained in the “straight duct” test on the A1 
test stand prior to the BTA and GTA tests, led to the following observations (Section 
7.1): 
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a. There is a fundamental similarity in the pressure time-history calculated by the 
Program Team and the ITA Team.  Both CFD results show a dominant 4N (four 
times rotational speed) unsteadiness in the pressure at a fixed location.  Both CFD 
results show variations between the amplitudes of the four pressure peaks that occur 
during each revolution, even though the geometry, the initial conditions, and the 
boundary conditions are identical for the four quadrants of the computational domain. 
 
b. There is a significant difference in the amplitude of the unsteady pressures calculated 
by the Program Team and the ITA Team.  The range between the maximum and 
minimum pressure during one revolution was ~60 percent higher in the Program 
Team’s CFD results, as compared to the ITA Team’s CFD results.  The ITA Team’s 
CFD results were about 25 percent higher than the measurements from the hot fire 
test. 
 
c. Significant differences are also seen between the gradients of pressure in the two 
CFD results. The Program Team’s CFD results show sharper spatial and temporal 
gradients in pressure than are seen in the ITA Team’s CFD results. This difference 
will be quantified when the ITA Team’s CFD runs are converged to periodicity. 
 
O-12. Factors affecting the similitude between the test article(s) and the Orbiter gimbal joint 
include the following: 
 
1. The BTA flowliner backing (bellows) cavity was enclosed with a rigid, thick, and 
cylindrical shell instead of the flight hardware's flexible bellows.  Therefore, the 
internal geometry of the backing cavity was different from the flight hardware 
(Appendix D.1.1). 
 
2. The BTAs/GTAs used BX-250 foam for insulation instead of a flight hardware 
vacuum jacket.  The calculated heat transfer of the test article is much higher than 
what would be expected in flight and most likely caused some vaporization of the 
LH2 in the backing cavity.  A two-phase flow environment would lead to significant 
changes in the local speed-of-sound, consequently altering the resonant frequency 
characteristics and interactions in the backing cavity, relative to the flight hardware 
(Section 7.1.1 and Appendix D.1.1). 
 
3. Due to the different upstream geometries (internal components and feedline 
configuration), the A1 test stand velocity profile (for both the BTA and GTA tests) of 
the flow approaching the test article was different from the flow field profiles in the 
Orbiter feedlines. Thus, the approaching flow’s interaction with the inducer’s reverse 
flow may be significantly different from the flight vehicle (Section 7.1.2). 
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4. Because of the different internal geometry and configurations, the A1 test stand 
feedline acoustic modes (for the BTA and GTA tests) are likely to be different from 
the Orbiter feedline acoustic modes (Sections 7.1 and 7.1.2). 
 
5. The test stand feedline mounting bracket (for the BTA and GTA tests) was of 
different material and configuration (both interface and dimensions) resulting in 
increased heat transfer into the test article relative to flight.  Also, the different 
coefficients of thermal expansion between the material of the test hardware and the 
Orbiter hardware would result in different thermal stresses in the gimbal joint flange 
and could affect the inducer tip clearance (Section 7.1.1). 
 
6. The gimbal joint weld bead in the BTA was machined smooth unlike those in the 
Orbiter and the GTA.  Thus, the wall boundary layer in the BTA test will not 
experience the local separation that occurs in the flight vehicles and GTA test 
(Section 7.1). 
 
Findings: 
 
F-12. There are no direct measurements of the flowliner loads in flight.  The Boeing load 
spectrum is semi-empirically derived and based on a series of conservative engineering 
assumptions in an attempt to ensure that a ‘worst-case’ nominal flight is enveloped by the 
spectrum (Section 7.2).  
 
F-13. Excessive heat transfer into the BTA results in a lack of similitude with the flight 
environment in the flowliner cavity.  This finding is based on the temperature 
measurements in the “bellows” cavity during the BTA test. The heat transfer was 8 times 
the value that occurs during flight, resulting in significant hydrogen vapor in the 
“bellows” cavity.  The vapor concentration was higher in the upstream end of the cavity 
than in the downstream end, based on the thermal response of the bellows cavity wall 
(Section 7.1). 
 
F-14. A significant load component in the BTA/GTA flowliners is due to a high frequency 
excitation.  This has been attributed to an edge tone and/or cavity resonance.  This 
supposition has not been conclusively shown to be part of the flight environment (Section 
7.1). 
 
F-15. CFD results for the straight duct hot fire test configuration have been verified by 
correlation with unsteady pressure measurements (Section 7.1). 
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F-16. (General Finding)  The similitude between the BTA/GTA ground tests environment and 
the Orbiter flight environment could not be established.  Therefore, there are uncertainties 
in the fatigue loading spectra developed from the BTA/GTA test data.  Unverified scale 
factors have been applied to the loads in the fatigue loading spectra in an attempt to 
account for these uncertainties.  Because of these uncertainties, there will be risks 
associated with any loading spectrum used to develop the flight rationale derived from 
the BTA/GTA experiment.  These concerns notwithstanding, we have concluded that the 
ground test data can be a suitable database to establish the certification spectra provided 
conservative scale factors based on appropriate engineering judgment are used to account 
for the uncertainties. 
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8.3 Proposed Flight Rationale 
A strategy for developing a flight rationale is proposed below.  The proposed flight rationale is 
built on the following three approaches:  Part I - Damage Tolerance Approach, Part II - Fatigue 
Life Approach (to crack initiation), and Part III - Risk Assessment.  In the design process, the 
fatigue life to crack initiation approach and the damage tolerance approach are complementary.   
Fatigue analysis and testing is used to determine the service life until cracks emerge (i.e., 
nucleate or initiate) at the hot spots of the structure.  (The fatigue life to crack initiation is 
sometimes referred to as structural durability).  Thereafter, the damage tolerance approach based 
on fracture mechanics is used to determine the critical crack size and the required in-service 
inspection intervals and methods.  If the critical crack size cannot be found by inspection, then 
the structure will be life limited.  Furthermore, if the structure has been found to be susceptible to 
fatigue cracks during its service lifetime, then the damage tolerance approach is conservatively 
applied to ensure that a rogue flaw or undiscovered hot spot does not result in a catastrophic 
failure.  Because of the uncertainty in the flight loads acting on the flowliners and the sensitivity 
of the fracture mechanics results to these loads, the development of the flight rationale might be 
difficult to achieve by only the damage tolerance approach.  Therefore, the flight rationale may 
depend on results from both Parts I and II.  Part III is a complement to both Parts I and II.   
 
Part I.  Damage Tolerance Approach 
A damage-tolerant part is one that possesses the ability to resist failure due to the presence of 
cracks during its service life.  A damage tolerance analysis assumes the existence of a crack in 
the most critical orientation and location of the structure.  The size of the assumed crack is based 
on the method of inspection. A stress analysis of the structure is performed to determine the peak 
stress locations where fatigue cracks initiate.  A crack of size equal to the inspection limit is 
assumed to exist in these peak stress locations.  The service life loading spectrum is then applied 
to the peak stress regions where these cracks are located.  A fracture mechanics analysis is used 
to predict the service life required for the assumed crack to grow to the critical crack size, usually 
defined as catastrophic failure.  Material property data is determined from laboratory tests where 
da/dN, change in crack length versus change in cycles, is measured as a function of ΔK in a 
standard test coupon containing a prescribed, pre-existing crack.  (See Figure 8.3-1).  ΔK is the 
alternating stress intensity factor, which is a function of both the crack size and loading.  It 
should be noted that fatigue crack growth rate data exhibit an apparent ΔK threshold below 
which small cracks are not observed to grow.  [Ref.: General Fracture Control Requirements for 
Manned Spacecraft Systems, NASA-STD-5007]. 
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Figure 8.3-1.  Crack Growth Rate Data for Inconel 718 (ref.:  NASGRO database) 
 
a. The NESC ITA damage tolerance analysis is based on loading spectra for a nominal flight 
conservatively developed using the BTA hot engine fire test series data.  If new loading 
spectra are developed for the certification cases, the damage tolerance analyses must be 
updated.   [Findings F-12, F-13, and F-14] 
b. The current NESC ITA results from the conservative, deterministic fracture mechanics 
analyses for the circumferential crack show a critical crack size of 0.020 inches for a residual 
fatigue life greater than four for the upstream liner and greater than one for the downstream 
liners.  This result for the downstream liner does not satisfy the requirement of a scatter 
factor of 4 on the service life factor as required by NASA-STD-5007.  [Findings F-3, F-4, 
and F-5] 
c. The fracture mechanics results also require an inspection of the flowliners after every flight.  
Based on the current, conservative fracture mechanics results, the inspection requirement is 
0.020 inches.  Traditional NDE methods with a 0.020-inch goal and nontraditional methods 
such as edge replication with a 0.005-inch goal are being evaluated. [Findings F-1, F-3, F-
10, and F-11] 
 
F-17. (General Finding):  Based on the NESC loading spectra for the nominal flight 
condition generated from the BTA test data, the conservative NESC ITA damage 
tolerance analysis requires inspection after every flight to detect a critical crack size 
of 0.020 inches.   
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Part II.  Fatigue Life Approach (to Crack Initiation) 
Fatigue may be defined as the cumulative damage incurred in materials caused by cyclic 
application of stresses and environments resulting in degradation of load carrying capability.  
The fatigue service life includes all significant loading cycles or events during the period 
beginning with manufacture of a component and ending with completion of its specified use.  
Unlike the damage tolerance approach, the fatigue life approach does not assume the pre-
existence of cracks governed by fracture mechanics.  The fatigue life approach addresses the 
service life to crack initiation, i.e., the service life required to nucleate a crack and grow it to the 
size that must be addressed by the damage tolerance approach.  A stress analysis of the structure 
is performed to determine the peak stress locations where fatigue cracks initiate.  The service life 
loading spectrum is applied to the peak stress regions of the structure.  The fatigue life is 
determined using fatigue data and a failure rule such as linear cumulative damage.  Material 
property (fatigue) data is determined from laboratory coupons where alternating stress, S, is 
measured as a function of cycles to failure, N.  See Figure 8.3-2.  The test failure is defined as a 
crack of detectable length in a standard test coupon that did not originally contain a prescribed 
crack but may contain typical manufacturing defects.  In order to use the fatigue life approach 
for return-to-flight certification of the flowliner, it is essential to assure that the structure 
has been screened from all significant pre-existing fatigue cracks.  Otherwise, the damage 
tolerance approach must apply.    [Ref.:  Structural Design and Test Factors of Safety for 
Spacecraft Hardware, NASA-STD-5001].  
 
 
Figure 8.3-2.  Fatigue Data for Inconel 718 (Ref.: Rocketdyne) 
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d. A high fidelity method such as edge replication must be used to inspect the slots to confirm 
that no manufacturing defects exist that will initiate new cracks. The slots may need 
additional polishing if the slot surface quality is not acceptable.  In addition, the inspection 
must confirm that no significant fatigue cracks, not detected in 2002, exists that result in a 
ΔK above the fatigue crack growth threshold where fracture mechanics applies.  Even though 
the edge replication method has been demonstrated in the laboratory to be a high fidelity 
method capable of detecting cracks to 0.001 inches and below, it may be difficult to find a 
pre-existing fatigue crack that was polished over in 2002.  This is because the polishing 
procedure may blend material into the opening of the crack thus closing the crack at the slot 
surface.  However, for the two orbiters (OV-104 and OV-105) that returned to flight in 2002, 
it is highly likely that the flight loads re-opened any existing fatigue crack, which would then 
be detectable by edge replication.  Conventional inspection methods such as the eddy current 
method must also be used to supplement the edge replication method.  Based on previously 
conducted POD studies, the expected inspection threshold is about 0.020 inches. This 
discrepancy between the conventional inspection method and the edge replication method is 
an inspection gap that introduces some degree of uncertainty.  The degree of uncertainty is 
greater for OV-103 which has not returned to flight since the slots were polished in 2002.  
[Findings F-1, F-6, F-7, F-8, F-9, F-10, and F-11] 
 
e. Using the current fatigue loading spectra based on the BTA test data, and using a 
conservative model for mean stress effects, the NESC ITA fatigue life to crack initiation 
results for the circumferential crack show a positive margin on fatigue life.  However, the 
fatigue life is 4 missions for the upstream flowliner and 8 missions for the downstream 
flowliner.  If new loading spectra are developed for the certification cases, the fatigue life 
analyses must be updated. [Findings F-12, F-13, and F-14] 
 
f. A fatigue scatter factor of 4 or greater does not provide a fatigue life (safe life limit) 
sufficient to cover the remaining anticipated operational life of each orbiter.  (NASA-STD-
5001 specifies a minimum service life factor of 4.  However, a scatter factor of 10 is typical 
for high cycle fatigue data).  [Finding F-6] 
 
g. Surface enhancement treatments offer a potential method to extend the safe life limit of the 
flowliners to beyond the anticipated operational life of the orbiters.  The NESC ITA is 
assessing the LPB method as a practical surface enhancement treatment that may be effective 
in delaying crack initiation and retarding crack growth.  The results from laboratory tests 
suggest a benefit in life of an order of magnitude or greater may be achieved by this method. 
F-18. (General Finding):  Based on the NESC loading spectra generated from the BTA 
test data, the conservative NESC ITA fatigue life analysis shows a positive margin of 
safety for one flight, but is not sufficient to cover the remaining anticipated 
operational life of each orbiter.    
  
NASA Engineering And Safety Center  
Report 
Document #: 
RP-04-11/ 
04-004-E 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Orbiter LH2 Feedline Flowliner Cracking Problem 
Independent Technical Assessment (ITA) Report 
Page #: 
 121 of 132 
 
 
Part III.  Risk Assessment 
PRA is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and 
assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving 
their safety and performance.   NASA has adopted Bayesian statistics as the basis for 
quantitatively assessing risk and uses QRAS or Saphire software codes to perform the analysis.   
A PRA model for all currently identified flowliner/SSME failure modes of the Orbiter 
propulsion system has been developed.  These failure modes include FOD generated by the 
flowliner and flowliner structural failure.  Both nominal and off-nominal SSME operations will 
be considered.  The event sequence diagram is shown in Figure 8.3-3.  [Ref.: Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners, Version 1.1, prepared for 
the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C., M. 
Stamatelatos, G. Apostolakis, H. Dezfuli, C. Everline, S. Guarro, A. Mosleh, T. Paulos,  R. 
Youngblood, August 2002]. 
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Figure 8.3-3.  Event Sequence Diagram for the Flowliner PRA 
 
h. The PRA shows that the risk of flowliner failure is much lower than the current risk of SSME 
failure.  Or stated differently, the risk of a flowliner failure does not increase the risk of an 
SSME failure by a meaningful amount.  If new loading spectra are developed for the 
certification cases, the PRA must be updated.  [Finding F-2] 
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9.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Conclusions: 
 
The conclusions stated below are based on the five General Findings previously reported in 
Chapter 8.  It is essential to note that these findings are based on the independent analyses 
conducted by the NESC for only the nominal flight condition.   The development of the flight 
rationale must be based on a complete assessment of the program-sanctioned loading spectra for 
all nominal and off-nominal flight conditions for which the orbiter must be certified before 
returning to flight.   
 
1. Based on the past flight history and the root causes investigation, the actions taken in 
2002 to repair the LH2 gimbal joint flowliners render the Orbiter safe to fly.  This is 
provided the flowliners are inspected before the next flight to ensure that all surface flaws 
were removed by polishing and all fatigue cracks were repaired.  In addition, an 
assessment of the certification loading spectra for the nominal and off-nominal flight 
conditions will be necessary to determine the post-flight inspection requirements.   
 
2. Based on a probabilistic risk assessment, the risk of SSME damage due to cracks in the 
flowliner is an insignificant contributor to the overall SSME catastrophic risk, assuming 
inspection after every flight. 
 
3. The similitude between the BTA/GTA ground tests environment and the Orbiter flight 
environment could not be established.  Therefore, there are uncertainties in the fatigue 
loading spectra developed from the BTA/GTA test data.  Unverified scale factors have 
been applied to the loads in the fatigue loading spectra in an attempt to account for these 
uncertainties.  Because of these uncertainties, there will be risks associated with any 
loading spectrum used to develop the flight rationale derived from the BTA/GTA 
experiment.  These concerns notwithstanding, we have concluded that the ground test 
data can be a suitable database to establish the certification spectra provided conservative 
scale factors based on appropriate engineering judgment are used to account for the 
uncertainties. 
 
4. Based on the NESC loading spectra for nominal flight conditions generated from the 
BTA/GTA test data, the conservative NESC ITA damage tolerance analysis for the 
circumferential crack locations requires inspection after every flight to detect a critical 
crack size of 0.020 inches and repair of any cracks found during the inspection.   Since 
these results were not generated for the official certification spectra, post-flight inspection 
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requirements must be determined from an assessment of the certification loading spectra 
for the nominal and off-nominal flight conditions. 
 
5. Based on the NESC loading spectra for nominal flight conditions generated from the 
BTA/GTA test data, the conservative NESC ITA fatigue life analysis shows a positive 
margin of safety for one flight, but is not sufficient to cover the remaining anticipated 
operational life of each orbiter. 
 
Based on the five General Findings stated above, the NESC ITA has concluded that the 
Orbiters are safe to return to flight provided the specific recommendations listed below are 
implemented: 
 
Recommendations: 
 
1. Establish the surface quality of the slots by using a high fidelity inspection method such as 
edge replication.  Assess the effectiveness of the original polishing done in 2002 to determine 
if all manufacturing defects have been removed.  Re-polish the slots as required to remove all 
significant surface defects.  Also, repair any fatigue cracks found during this inspection. 
 
2. Perform a damage tolerance analysis for all certification conditions to establish the critical 
crack size, the required inspection method to detect the critical crack size, and the required 
inspection interval.  
 
3. Conduct a POD study and develop the inspection procedure that must be used to meet the 
requirements of the damage tolerance analysis. 
 
4. Change the orbiter operational procedures to implement the inspection requirements 
established by Recommendation 2. 
 
5. Perform a fatigue analysis for all certification conditions to estimate the fatigue life to crack 
initiation.  This establishes the safe life limit on the flowliners.  These results may be used in 
lieu of the damage tolerance approach (Recommendation 2) provided the results satisfy the 
requirements of NASA Standard 5001 and the NASA Fracture Control Board grants a waiver 
of the NASA Standard 5007. 
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10.0 LESSONS LEARNED 
 
LESSON LEARNED 1:  Formal, archival documentation of the original investigation and 
the subsequent tests and analyses conducted to resolve the problem were substantially 
incomplete.  The discipline of preparing and peer reviewing formal engineering reports 
leads to a high degree of accuracy and technical rigor. 
  
It has been two years since the cracks were originally discovered in the flowliners at the gimbal 
joint of the LH2 feedlines.  In that time, numerous important observations, analyses, and tests 
have been accomplished.  The ITA Team found extensive documentation archived on a web site 
(SSPWEB) maintained by the Program Office.  However, the preponderance of documentation is 
in the form of briefing charts prepared for oral presentations.  Also, the team found extensive 
technical information available from individual engineers working on the problem resolution 
team.  Unfortunately, much of this information was not properly documented in formal 
engineering reports.  Also, there is no evidence that critical findings were formally peer 
reviewed.  While numerous examples of incomplete documentation could be sited, two specific 
examples are discussed below to illustrate the potential implications of the lack of technical rigor 
that might occur when formal documentation is not required and the results are not 
independently verified through peer review.   
 
The location, orientation, and length of cracks originally found in the fleet in 2002 could not be 
determined from the original documentation given to the ITA Team.  In fact, the numerous 
problem summary briefings given by engineers and senior team leaders, dating from August 
2002 to January 2004, contained conflicting data on both the number of cracks found in each 
orbiter and the length of these cracks.  To resolve these discrepancies, an extensive effort was 
required to re-analyze the original inspection data obtained in 2002.  During this effort to 
establish accurate crack information, it was discovered that several cracks were kinked rather 
than extending in a self-similar crack growth direction as was implied by the sketches and 
analyses reported in the briefing charts.  This is a significant finding because kinked cracks like 
those found in the orbiters, typically exhibit bifurcation behavior and change crack growth 
direction due to complexities in the global stress field.  This is critical information in determining 
the root causes of the cracks observed in the fleet.  In fact, incorrect conclusions regarding the 
problem resolution could have resulted from this omission of critical evidence. 
 
As part of the investigation, two engine hot fire test series were conducted at Stennis Space 
Center.  The purpose of these tests was to better understand the feedline flow physics and the 
associated forcing functions, which define the spectrum loadings on the flowliner.  The first test 
series used a BTA with a fixed joint and without a flexible bellow.  The second test series used a 
GTA with a gimbaled joint and flexible bellow.   Not only did NASA invest considerable 
resources to conduct these tests, the interpretation of the test results has led to an escalation in 
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concern over the structural integrity of the flowliners and an additional expenditure of tens of 
millions of dollars in an attempt to develop a new flight rationale.  Yet, there is no formal test 
report that documents the calibration of instrumentation, test procedures, sequence of test events, 
test data acquisition, and post-test data reduction.  Furthermore, there is no formal documentation 
of the engineering details regarding how the data was used to develop a loading spectrum and the 
associated prediction of the residual fatigue lives of the flowliners. 
 
Recommendation 1: Require formal reports to be generated for orbiter hardware inspections 
and for the results of testing. 
 
Recommendation 2: Institute a system whereby all documentation associated with the SSP be 
available in a single location. This information should include, but not be limited to, all plans and 
drawings, all qualification test plans and results, all flight data, and all subsequent testing plans 
and results. 
 
LESSON LEARNED 2:  Ground testing should be conducted in as close to flight 
configuration as possible.  Where differences between ground and flight configurations or 
environments are necessary, every effort to correlate the ground test data to actual flight 
situations must be made.  One of the most difficult obstacles to overcome in the flowliner 
investigation has been the disparity of the propellant feed systems between the ground-based test 
facility and the flight vehicle.   
 
NASA does not have a Flight-Configured Main Propulsion System (MPS) Ground Test Facility 
that accurately simulates the flight environment.  Differences between the ground-based test 
facility and the flight vehicle can singularly and collectively degrade the fidelity of ground-based 
hot fire tests in characterizing the flight environment.  Examples encountered during the course 
of this investigation include the following: 
• Differences in the feedline weld bead in feedline between flowliners and SSME interface; 
• Differences in thermal insulation (i.e., vacuum jacket vs. BX-250 SOFI) on the feedlines; 
• Differences in feedline layout (i.e., line lengths, bends, flex joints, valves, flow meters); 
and 
• Differences in sensors and sensor locations. 
The inability to accurately replicate the flight conditions of the MPS in a ground test has been a 
persistent difficulty in determining the fundamental root cause of the flowliner issue.  Significant 
resources and schedule time have been expended to overcome the need for a test facility that 
replicates the collective environment (e.g., flow, structural, dynamic, thermal, etc.) of the actual 
flight vehicle.  A facility dedicated to subjecting the engine and supporting feed system to a 
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high-fidelity flight environment could be used for acceptance tests, green run tests, and fleet 
leader extension tests. 
The MPTA was useful in certifying the MPS for the shuttle, but was retired early in the program.  
It would not be necessary to configure the system to accommodate all the engines used in the 
MPS, but to replicate the fluid environment that one engine would be exposed to, with the 
flexibility of expanding the resolution of the system environment to include as many engines as 
needed.  With regard to the MPS environment of subsequent vehicle programs, the 
instrumentation suite incorporated into the ground facility could be integrated into the propellant 
system without significant affect to the characterization of the system environment. 
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11.0 DEFINITION OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 
 
Definition of Terms 
 
Finding  
A conclusion based on facts established during the assessment/inspection by the investigating 
authority.  
 
Lessons Learned  
Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may be positive, as in a 
successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap or failure. A lesson must be significant in 
that it has real or assumed impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically 
correct; and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision that reduces or 
limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a positive result.  
 
Observation  
A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the assessment/inspection that did not 
contribute to the problem, but if left uncorrected has the potential to cause a mishap, injury, or 
increase the severity should a mishap occur.  
 
Problem  
The subject of the independent technical assessment/inspection. 
 
Recommendation  
An action developed by the assessment/inspection team to correct the cause or a deficiency 
identified during the investigation.  
 
Root Cause  
Along a chain of events leading to a mishap or close call, the first causal action or failure to act 
that could have been controlled systemically either by policy/practice/procedure or individual 
adherence to policy/practice/procedure. 
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Acronyms 
 
BSTRA  Ball Strut Tie Rod Assembly  
BTA  Battleship Test Article 
CC  Corner Crack 
CFD  Computational Fluid Dynamics 
DOF  Degree of Freedom 
DS  Downstream 
ESD  Event Sequence Diagram 
ET  External Tank 
FCG   Fatigue Crack Growth 
FEM  Finite Element Model  
FFA  Forward Fracture Analysis 
FPL  Flight Power Level 
FOD  Foreign Object Debris 
GSFC  Goddard Space Flight Center  
GTA   Gimbal Test Article 
ID  Inner Diameter 
ITA  Independent Technical Assessment 
JSC   Johnson Space Center 
K  Heat Transfer Coef. (btu/hr-ft-oR) 
L          Length (ft) 
LDR   Linear Damage Rule 
LH2      Liquid Hydrogen 
LHe  Liquid Helium 
LO2  Liquid Oxygen 
LPB  Low Plasticity Burnishing 
LPFP  Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump  
MLP  Multi-Level Parallelizm  
MPS     Main Propulsion System 
MPTA  Main Propulsion Test Article 
MSFC  Marshall Space Flight Center 
N       Pump Rotation Rate (rev./min.) 
NDE  Nondestructive Evaluation 
NESC  NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NPSP  Net Positive Suction Pressure (psi) 
NRB  NESC Review Board 
OD  Outer Diameter 
OP  Orbiter Program 
OV  Orbiter Vehicle 
Po       Total pressure 
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POD  Probability of Detection 
Poi      Total Pressure at the Pump Inlet (psi) 
PRA  Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Pvi       Hydrogen Vapor Pressure (psi) 
q        Heat Transfer (btu/hr.) 
Q        Pump Flow Rate (gal./min.) 
ri         Inner Radius (ft) 
ro        Outer Radius (ft) 
RPL  Relative Power Level 
S&MA Safety & Mission Assurance 
SG  Strain Gage 
SOFI    Spray On Foam Insulation 
SPRT  Super Problem Resolution Team 
SSME  Space Shuttle Main Engine 
TC  Through Crack 
TR  Transfer Ratio 
Ti    Temperature at Inner Radius (oR) 
TIM  Technical Interchange Meeting 
To         Temperature at Outer Radius (oR) 
UP  Upstream 
V         Velocity (ft/s) 
ρ  Density (lbm/ft3) 
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Volume II: Appendices 
 
NOTE 
 
 The Appendices are not provided as part of the Technical 
Memorandum. For more information on the Appendices, or to obtain 
a copy of an Appendix, please contact the NASA Engineering and 
Safety Center (NESC) at NESC@nasa.gov. 
 
 
A. ITA/I Request Form (NESC-PR-003-FM-01) 
B. Original NESC Flowliner ITA Plan  
C. Reference Materials  
C.1 LO2 Type II Engine 1 Feedline Qualification and Test History 
C.2 MPS Flowliner Replication Team Status Report 
C.3 Investigation of Shuttle MPTA LH2 Flowliner Crack.  Huntington Beach/Seal Beach 
Site Host Engineering Function Material & Process Engineering Laboratory Report; 
Lab Report No. M&PE-2-1327, dtd. 3 January 2003   
C.4 Original LO2 Qualification Test Report Summary: Crack Summary. Federal Mogul 
Document Number MPS-QTR-13542-302.  Appelman, H., 1979 
C.5 Compilation of the Crack Inspection Data 
D. Engineering Reports of Tests and Analyses  
D.1 Loading Environment 
D.1.1 Battleship Test Article (BTA) Thermal Analysis Effects (Fred W. Martin, NASA JSC) 
D.1.2 Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) Analysis for the Orbiter LH2 Feedline Flowliner 
(Cetin C. Kiris, NASA ARC) 
D.1.3 Assessment of Unsteady Flow Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) Results for the 
Orbiter Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) Feedline Flowliner (Milind A. Bakhle, NASA GRC) 
D.2 Development of the Fatigue Loading Spectrum 
D.2.1 Review of the Shuttle Main Propulsion System LH2 Feedline Flowliner Load Spectrum 
Development (Kenny B. Elliot, NASA LaRC) 
D.2.2 Structural Dynamic Analyses (Daniel S. Kaufman, NASA GSFC) 
D.2.3 Development of Transfer Factors for the STS Flowliners (Swales Aerospace, SAI-TM-
2564) 
D.2.4 Development of a Flowliner Load Spectrum (Swales Aerospace, SAI-TM-2558, Rev. C)  
D.2.5 Modal Response ID of Shuttle Flowliners (Swales Aerospace, SAI-TM-2636)  
D.3 Damage Tolerance (Fracture Mechanics) Analysis Methods and Results 
D.3.1 Fracture Mechanics Analyses of the SSME LH2 Feedline Flowliners (Ivatury S. Raju, et 
al, NASA LaRC) 
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D.3.2 Small Fatigue Crack Growth and Residual Stress (Robert S. Piascik, et al, NASA LaRC) 
D.3.3 Residual Stresses in SSME LH2 Flowliners (Dominion Engineering, Inc., DEI-823)  
D.3.4 Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Analysis of LH2 Flowliner for the Space Shuttle Main 
Engine (Southwest Research Institute®, SwRI Project No. 18.10592)  
D.4 Fatigue Life to Crack Initiation Analysis Methods and Results 
D.4.1 Modeling Crack Initiation Behavior in Shuttle Gimbal Joint Flowliners (Peter J. 
Bonacuse, NASA GRC) 
D.5 Examination and Inspection Methods 
D.5.1 NESC Review of Shuttle Flowliner Nondestructive Evaluation (Eric I. Madaras, NASA 
LaRC) 
D.5.2 Surface Replica Inspection of the MPTA Flowliners (Robert S. Piascik, et al, NASA 
LaRC) 
D.5.3 Detection of Flowliner Slot Surface Fatigue Cracks by the Replica Method (Robert S. 
Piascik, et al, NASA LaRC) 
D.6 Crack Initiation and Surface Enhancement 
D.6.1 Crack Initiation and Surface Enhancement (Gary R. Halford, NASA GRC)  
D.6.2 Low Plasticity Burnishing for Suppressing Fatigue Crack Initiation and Propagation in 
Space Shuttle LH2 Flowliners (Gary R. Halford, NASA GRC in conjunction with 
Lambda Research, Metcut Research, Inc., Ohio Aerospace Institute, and Ohio State 
University) 
D.7 Additional Tests 
D.7.1 Two-Dimensional Air-Flow Tests of the Effect of ITA Flowliner Slot 
Modification (Hersh Walker Acoustics) 
D.7.2 Acoustical Tests in Support of ITA Flowliner Crack Investigation (Daniel L. 
Sutliff, NASA GRC) 
D.7.3 Water Flow Velocity Measurements in the Space Shuttle Hydrogen Feedline 
(UCLA, Department of Mechanical Engineering) 
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